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The Social Security Reforms in Chile: Can a Privatized System Work? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile implemented a privatized Social Security system in 1924. The system was 
designed to provide benefits to all individuals within the state.  However, inefficiency and lack 
of contribution, hindered the state-run program from the beginning? In 1952, politicians 
implemented a 'Pay as you go System' (PAYGO) which encouraged individuals to put their 
savings into a government run savings account.  Once again, a lack of contributions combined 
with government deficits and benefits received by non-contributors, hindered the system.  In 
1973, Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the Allende government, and began to implement neoliberal 
policies advocated by the "Chicago Boys."3 These individuals studied in the United States, and 
 
supported Milton Friedman's idea of a completely open economy and the privatization of all 
industries.4 Continued state debt, and poor economic growth motivated Augusto Pinochet to 
implement their suggested privatization policies.  In 1980, Chile privatized Social Security 
industry, and required all individuals who entered the workforce after 1980 to use 
Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones (AFPs).  These were designed to encourage more 
individual savings and less reliance on the government. 5 
 
 
However, after close to 30 years of AFPs, problems have emerged.  First, evidence shows 
that individuals from the highest economic brackets receive the most benefits. 6 Secondly, the 
introduction of private pensions has not significantly increased individual overall savings or 
 
2 Peter Diamond and Salvador Valdes, "Social Security Reforms in Chile," Documento de Trabajo, 161 (1993):  13. 
3 Silvia Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago: Neoliberalism and Social Security Privatization in Chile," 4 (2005): 
659. 
4 Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:" 659. 
5  Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:" 663. 
6 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Social Protection in Chile: Reforms to Improve Equity," 147 (2008): 377. 
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reduced reliance on government. 7 Consequently, criticism has emerged focusing on the current 
system.  Chile is unlikely to return to a fully state-run system and as a result, the system must be 
changed in order to increase benefits for individuals.  The public needs to have easier access to 
information about the AFP system.  A more informed public, will save more effectively, and 
therefore be more prepared for retirement. 8 Secondly, a more informed population, means that 
those who lack sufficient salaries to put in AFP's, know how to access government benefits that 
can supplement an individual's pension. 9 
Even with these suggested changes, the Chilean pension system remains contradictory. 
While it encourages individuals to save for retirement thereby reducing reliance on the 
government, many individuals who use the system do not receive sufficient benefits which will 
allow them to retire in the future.10 As a result, they have increasingly become dependent on 
government aid which has resulted in reforms targeting those in the lowest economic income 
groups. 11 However, these changes remain contradictory because neoliberalism advocated an 
economy dominated by business that could address social needs, but this has not occurred. As a 
result, the government has re-entered  the social sphere in order to address economic inequalities. 
Neoliberals who once claimed that privatization would minimize government expenditure failed 
to fulfill their promises. 12 The neoliberal reforms implemented in Chile, resulted in inequality 
and government need to address this in order to improve overall standards of living. 
 
Roadmap 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Alberto Arenas de Mesa et al, "The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: Lessons from the Social Protection 
Survey," National Bureau of Economic Research, (2006): 23 
8 Alberto Arenas de Mesa et al, "The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25," 23. 
9 Alberto Arenas de Mesa et al, ","The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25," 23. 
10 Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:" 672. 
11 Carmela Mesa Lago, "Social Protecci6n in Chile:" 394. 
12 Silvia Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:" 672. 
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This paper is broken down into 12 sections. Section I examines the implementation of 
the first Chilean Social Security system, and focuses on the reasons that debt was accumulated.  
It looks at the modifications of the old public pension system, and examines the problems with 
the implementation of the PAYGO system implemented in Chile in 1952.13  Section !!focuses on 
the factors that led to the privatized Social Security system under the Pinochet regime, and, the 
paper examines the political ramifications, which encourage Pinochet to implement a privatized 
security system. Section III briefly discusses the functions of a "Pay-As-You-Go System" 
(PAYGO) by looking at its benefits, as well as its flaws, and shows that a fully public pension 
lacks significant advantages for the state and its population.  Section IV outlines the foundation 
for the current privatized system in Chile and looks at the basic components of the system. 
Section V briefly highlights the positive economic effects that have been generated by AFPs. 
Section VI addresses the major problems with a fully privatized pension system.  Section VII 
examines responses to the people I interviewed about their overall perceptions of the pension 
system.  Section VIII, will lead to the conclusion using individual's analysis of their own system 
leading to specific changes that can be made in the system that could give individuals more 
incentives to put money into their retirement funds.  Section IX provides closing remarks and 
conclusions.  Section X provides the reader with the questions I asked and respondents' answers 
to my questions.  My annotated bibliography is in section XI.  The works cited page is found in 
section XII. 
 
The Old Social Security System 
 
 
Chile implemented its first Social Security system in 1924, which required both 
individuals and corporations to contribute to a Social Security system that provided benefits the 
 
13 Peter Diamond and Salvador Valdes, "Social Security Reforms in Chile," 13. 
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public.  Corporations that had provided private Social Security policies to their employees prior 
to 1924 were allowed to continue their programs.  Individuals who did not use companies Social 
Security benefits placed their wages in social security institutions (SSis).  Overall contribution to 
the SSis varied based on economic income blue-collar workers contributed 5% of their salary 
while white-collar workers contributed 10%. Nevertheless, the initial system failed to remain 
self-sustaining because of poor investment practices by the government.  While Diamond and 
Valdes note,  that total contributions rose from 1937 onwards, they state "[while] substantial 
surplus accumulated and was invested in government bonds ... investment performance was 
dismal... prices doubled and the real value of government bond portfolio held by SSis fell to half 
[of their real value]. '"4   The overall contributions that individuals made lost significant value and 
 
acted as a deterrent to individuals placing money in the individual SSis.  In 1952, Chile 
implemented a 'Pay as you Go' (PAYGO) system that was supposed to give individuals a greater 
opportunity to earn pension savings yields through more state aid. 15 
 
Diamond and Valdes note, "if pensions were going to be paid [by the state] a financial 
crunch was unavoidable ... reforms required a massive increase in contribution rates, spread out 
over three years." 16   The creation of a separate Social Security fund independent from a health- 
care fund meant that individuals had to contribute a higher percentage of their overall income 
under the new system.  Diamond and Valdes note, that the implementation of the new system 
increased "the tax on formal labor... from 9% to 32% of [their] taxable salary." 17 Thus, workers 
were paying approximately 113 of their overall salary to the government sponsored PAYGO 
system that was designed to help them have enough finances for retirement.  Arguably, a high 
 
14 Diamond  and Valdes, 12. 
15 Diamond and Valdes, 14. 
16 Diamond and Valdes, 13. 
17 Diamond and Valdes.,  13. 
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percentage of workers ' salaries detected them from contributing to the PAYGO pension system . 
"The [PAYGO] reform failed to create political incentives to make sure that all benefit increases 
were financed ... new groups with full benefits were added, even though they had not completed 
their contributions, these expenditures were first charged to the SSI, without legislating any tax 
increase or explicit revenue source to finance them." 18   Clearly, individuals were receiving 
retirement benefits from the government without contributing to the system.  This drained 
government resources because it contributed to retirement funds without being reimbursed for its 
expenditures.  Furthermore, overall profits the government received from funding the system for 
public pensions were minimal.  Diamond and Valdes note, "1950-1977 shows that the real value 
of assets held by private SSis increased by 804% and only 57% for large public SSis." The 
overall benefits that individuals received from the public PAYGO system were minimal. 
 
As Solange Bernstein et al. note, "The collections became insufficient to finance the 
benefits granted to various worker groups with the result that the contribution rates continued to 
rise." 19 Higher contribution rates, diminished individual's incentives to contribute to the system. 
Solange Bernstein et al note, "When these [funds from people] also proved insufficient, it 
became necessary to increase contributions from the state."20 The state was forced to implement 
more resources in order to ensure that its population received the continuous health and 
 
retirement benefits that had been established in the 1924 social security reforms.  This continued 
to drain government resources needed to address other problems within the Chilean economy . 
As Bernstein et al note, "The state contribution to the old system for financing pensions 
represented a considerable part of government income.  It remained about [35%] of the pensions 
 
18 Diamond and Valdes 14. 
19  Solange Bernstein et al, "The Old System" in Chile 2008: A Second Generation Pension Reform, Superintendence 
of Pensions," (2008): 34. 
20Solange Bernstein et al, "The Old System," (2008): 34. 
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systems income on average which meant about 3% of GDP between  1975 and 1980."21 Reducing 
government expenses was unfathomable because the contribution rates for both employers and 
workers remained relatively high which meant that their ability to continuously contribute to the 
system was diminishing.22   Thus, the government accepted a greater role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pre-1980 Old-Age System Revenues and Expenditures: 1974-1980 
 
, 
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Presidential leaders in Chile had recognized the problems with the provisional pension 
system . Peter Diamond and Salvador Valdes, note that several presidential administrations 
commissioned reports on the successes of the old public pension system, and each stated that 
Chile was incurring increasing amounts of debt.  Diamond and Valdes note, "[attempts to modify 
the pension system through the] 1952 reform failed to create political incentives that would make 
sure that all benefit increases were financed. "23 The lack of public financing forced the 
 
government to pay for social services it could not afford.  "Although the pension system fell far 
short from performing its insurance purpose adequately, this does not mean that its finances were 
 
2 1  Solange Bernstein et al, "The Old System," 35. 
22 Solange Bernstein et al, "The Old System," 35. 
23 Diamond and Valdes, 14. 
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out of control, because the level of benefits was quite are low."24 Even though Valdez and 
Diamond suggest that, the government was not over exerting its resources and, the low level of 
services that individuals received shows that the government was unable to provide sufficient 
services to its public.  Bernstein et al show fiscal inequality was occurring by noting 
"contributions to the system represented approximately 65% of the total income [from businesses 
and individuals] the second major source of income for financing the benefits came from the 
state representing about 30% of the total income."25   Businesses were paying more to provide 
 
Social Security to their employees than the government.  Since the public pension system was 
financed by the people, a reduction in their contributions indicates that the system was paying for 
services it could not afford . 
Governments attempted to prevent this from occurring, but political cleavages and the 
population's unwillingness to accept change prevented reform.  Silvia Borzutzky notes that prior 
to the implementation of the private pension system, there were over 160 different Social 
Security funds run by the government, which were designed to address workers needs.  Because 
of the different "Cajas" (different industrial groups), workers received different benefits from the 
state pension system based on the arrangements they had with their employers.  Nevertheless, 
Borzutzky notes that attempts to create a more equitable system where workers receive the same 
benefits regardless of their overall skill of expertise failed.  Ex- Chilean President Eduardo Frei 
noted, "In matters related to social security, all agree in considering unjust and inconvenient the 
present rules, but when the moment arrives for people to lose their privileges they rebel violently 
and bring all sorts of pressure to bear. "26   The lack of popular support for changing the Social 
 
Security system in Chile was a major hindrance.  As Borzutzky states, "The crisis of social 
 
 
24 Diamond and Valdes, 14. 
25 Bernstein et al, "The Old System," 34, 
26 Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:"  657. 
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security was a by-product of Chile's unique democratic system: the expansion of political 
participation, the power of labor and entrepreneurs over the state... and the unwillingness of 
politicians to carry out the political reforms that would [establish a] more efficient and equitable 
social security system."27   Thus, the political cleavages created by the labor sectors, through their 
political influence prevented the government from implementing a more efficient pension 
system. 
 
Augusto Pinochet and the Implementation of Open Market Polices in Chile 
 
 
The implementation of neoliberalism was linked to the implementation of a privatized 
Social Security system.  Leaders' attempts to privatize certain sectors of the economy while 
allowing other sectors to remain public failed; as a result, economic leaders favored the complete 
privatization of all industries including Social Security.  After gaining power in the 1973 coup, 
Pinochet implemented policies that strengthened his power.  One of his first initiatives was the 
overhaul of the public Social Security program.  Facing large amounts of government debt, 
Pinochet abandoned the old public system, and implemented a private one?8 Silvia Borzutzky 
 
notes, "the crisis of Social Security was a byproduct of Chile's unique democratic system: the 
expansion of political participation, the power of labor, and entrepreneurs over the state... and the 
unwillingness of politicians to carry out the political reforms that would [establish] a more 
efficient and equitable Social Security system ."29   Inefficiencies within the system required 
changes in order to reduce government debt, and provide efficient services to the population. 
This led to the implementation of neoliberal policies advocated by the Chicago boys who argued 
that through the implementation of neoliberalism which privatize all industries, could improve 
 
 
27 Borzutzky, 657. 
28 Borzutzky, 652., 
29 Borzutzky, 657. 
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the inefficiency in Chilean Social Security.  Borzutzky notes, "Following von Hayek's 
[economic principles] his Chilean disciples argue that the market [was] the only social 
arrangement capable of regulating human interaction without coercion . .. the goal was to have 
the marketplaces act as a central regulator of economic activity guaranteeing efficiency and 
growth. "30 
 
 
Two groups competed against each other in Pinochet's administration as each attempted 
to implement its favored Social Security proposals.  Initially, the National Planning Office 
(ODEPLAN) advocated more moderate economic policies than neoliberals.  After the military 
took over the organization, it started a recruitment process that attracted more conservative 
economic analysts who emphasized privatizing the economy.  Members of ODEPLAN proposed 
a privately owned and administered Social Security system.31    Conversely, the Superintendence 
 
led by the corporatists advocated for a Social Security pension program that was controlled by 
the government.  The Pinochet regime attempted to combine the two divergent policy measures 
in order to implement a new Social Security system, called the Ante proyecto del Estado 
Fundamental de Principios y Bases del Sistema de Seguridad Social.  Papadopulos notes, 
"[critics] blamed the project for having financial rather than social concerns.  Criticisms were 
also centered around the nature and management of the corporations, the nature of the 
individual 
capital accounts, and the elimination of pensions based on years of service."32 Clearly, 
 
individuals feared that with the implementation of the new system those who had saved their 
money in the government-funded system would lose retirement savings.  The attempts to create a 
new Social Security system based on differing ideologies between the ODEPLAN organization 
 
30 Borzutzky, 659. 
31 Jorge Papadopulos, "Politics and Ideas in Policymaking: Reforming Pension Systems in Comparative Perspective. 
The Case of Uruguay and Chile," 36. 
32  Jorge  Papadopulos,  "Politics and Ideas  in Policymaking,"37 . 
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and the Superintendence created criticism, and showed that the government's attempt to 
implement a new Social Security form was not supported by Chileans. 
 
The Superintendence believed that the implementation of the neoliberal reforms was 
harmful to the economic growth and political power individuals held in Chile.  Those in power 
who favored a more moderate economic stance "argued against the individual pension accounts 
because the envisaged system would not benefit the workers but the financial institutions ... the 
system of individual insurance would only serve to create a new center of economic power and 
[furthermore] ... a different economic and financial situations would yield negative interest 
rates."33  Viewed from this context, the implementation of a privatized security system meant 
 
that corporations seeking to maximize profit were in charge of crucial Social Security benefits. 
However, Superintendents feared that individuals would lose part of their pension savings with 
the implementation of privatized social security because corporations would not be worried  
about losing pension savings since individuals were required to put their money in a private 
pension fund.  Furthermore, they argued that the privatized system would hurt Chileans and the 
economy more because a transition to a privatized economy would increase the overall costs that 
Chile would incur because it would have to fund the creation of the Social Security system.34 
 
Thus, these factors prevented a joint presentation amongst the members of ODEPLAN and 
Superintendence from proposing a mutually beneficial social security system. 
 
After Augusto Pinochet gained power in the 1973 coup, neoliberals within his 
administration argued for the implementation of a privatized social security system, which would 
create unity within the state.  They argued individuals pursued their own benefits and the current 
 
 
33 Papadopulos, 37. 
34 Papadopulos,  37 
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government policies that sent different amounts of funds to different sectors meant that the 
government chose winners and losers thereby creating different factions.  Jose Pinera, the 
architect of the current privatized Social Security system, claimed a market system allowed 
individuals to pursue their own goals without being limited by governments.  Prior to the Social 
Security reforms, Pinera noted, "Freedom was a blasphemy.  Nobody had the right to choose 
where to save. Nobody could establish, not even in his dreams, a pension fund managing 
institution.  Competition was systematically prohibited."35 Thus, the creation of a new Social 
Security system was highly linked to the ideals of the neoliberal philosophy, which emphasized 
minimal government interference and individual priorities. 36 The individual priorities favored 
industry by allowing it to pursue beneficial economic policies.  As Eduardo Silvia notes, "radical 
internationalists pushed harder for more draconian market liberalization because they saw it as 
an opportunity to increase their economic empires [that were hindered by the previous 
government.]"37   Liberalization of the economy did not truly adhere to the idea of more 
individual freedom; instead it was based on giving corporations the ability to create another 
source of revenue. 38 
 
According to Jorge Papadopulos, the Social Security system implemented under the 
Pinochet regime was heavily insulated from outside interests.  After the regime came to power 
there was a heavy emphasis on reversing the policies implemented under the Allende regime. 
Papadopulos notes, that after Pinochet's rise to power, two political factions emerged.  The 
Superintendencia simply wanted to minimize the power within the executive branch and reverse 
 
 
 
35 Jose Pinera, cited in Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago," 662 
36 Borzutzky,   662. 
37 Eduardo Silva, "Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 1977-88," World 
Politics,  45 (I993): 545. 
38 Eduardo Silva, "Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring ,"545. 
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the nationalization policies that were implemented under the Allende administration. 39 However, 
as economic problems continued Pinochet relied on more conservative neoliberal economic 
thought.  This thought differed from the Superintendencia, because it emphasized the 
privatization of all sectors, while the Superintendencia maintained that government should 
continue to play a role in the economic market.  Pinochet followed neoliberal economic 
principles in an attempt to strengthen the economy thereby strengthening his government.  As 
Papadopulos, notes, "since [the] economic policy measures did not change the expected results 
[by] 1975 corporatists began to be displaced and neoliberal started to consolidate their position 
inside government...  Pinochet based his power on the ideological claims of the neoliberal groups 
inside and outside government urging for deeper reforms."40 Pinochet and the implementation of 
 
neoliberal reforms were symbiotic: the neoliberals needed Pinochet to implement more drastic 
open-market principles and Pinochet needed the neoliberals to implement economic policies , 
which would strengthen the economy thereby strengthening his regime. 
 
Neoliberal advocates were gradually gaining power within the Pinochet regime, allowing 
them to implement their favored Social Security policies.  Nowhere was this more evident than 
in the increasing number of neoliberals who were given positions in ODEPLAN because they 
supported its neoliberal policies.  Papadopulos notes, "Changes at the level of the structure of 
economic decision-making started with the replacement of Fernando Leniz by Sergio de Castro 
in the Ministry of economy and later by the designation of de Castro as Ministry of finances and 
his own replacement in the Ministry of economy by Pedro Barona."41 Clearly, the changes in the 
 
economic policymaking sphere indicated that the radical economy proposed by neoliberal 
 
 
 
 
39 Papadopulos "Politics and Ideas in Policymaking," 21. 
40 Papadopulos  22. 
4 1 Papadopulos , 38. 
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advocates was becoming harder to ignore.  Thus the Pinochet regime had decided to implement a 
system advocated by the neoliberals, and avoid and more state-funded government advocated by 
the Superintendence. 
 
As Kurtz notes, the Pinochet regime made strong attempts to develop a corporatist 
relationship with all sectors of society.  However, it was initially unable to control all aspects of 
it, because it lacked a strong foundational base that would support the government in its attempts 
to implement market-oriented reforms.  The Pinochet regime dismantled" ... the remaining social 
and political organizations that had been the bedrock of the previous democratic regime ..."42 The 
 
implementation of new economic reforms under the Pinochet regime tried to weaken political 
institutions that threatened his power.  As Kurtz notes, "as pressures for political opening 
mounted, the overarching goal of political stabilization was pursued by creating new patterns of 
social organization that would be, by their very structure inhospitable to statist or Marxist policy 
proposals.  Crucially this centered on an individualized, highly targeted, and market mediated 
form of state society interaction ..."43 Thus, the implementation of privatized Social Security, was 
 
not only designed to weaken links between politicians and labor organizations, it was also an 
attempt to weaken support for opposition parties by breaking the link between political reelection 
in the distribution of incentives.  As Kurtz concludes, "no longer were legal/institutional barriers 
alone to prevent the reemergence of leftist political tendencies ... market led social transformation 
would also play this role."44 Thus, Pinochet used neoliberal economic policies to strengthen his 
 
own power within the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Marcus Kurtz, "Chile's Neoliberal Revolution : Incremental Decisions and Structural Transformation. 1973- 
1989," Journal of Latin American studies 34(1999): 412, 413. 
43Marcus Kurtz, "Chile's Neoliberal  Revolution:". ,415. 
44 Marcus Kurtz, "Chile's Neoliberal Revolution:".,415.
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Clearly, diminished support for the Pinochet regime, forced Augusto Pinochet, to 
implement an economic policy that would stabilize his government.  Papadopulos notes, "As 
minister of labor, Jose Pinera undertook the most enduring social transformations...  [he had to]: 
a) coordinate the labor and economic sectors of the government; b) to institutionalize a new 
system of labor relations creating a free depoliticized labor organization; and c) to reform the 
Social Security system."45   The implementation of the new Social Security system was designed 
to weaken workers power; their power over businesses through strikes weakened economic 
 
productivity and forced government to implement labor friendly laws.  The new Social Security 
system depoliticized labor, by forcing it to become less reliant on government aid.  Weakening 
the link between laborers and government, made it more difficult for future governments to 
implement policies, which hurt businesses.  Furthermore, the implementation of the system 
benefited the economic prospects for Chile because with a weaker labor union, economic growth 
would not be hindered by individual's desires for more benefits.  Neoliberals supported this 
policy by arguing that an open market created more business and industrialization, and with 
different labor laws, foreign businesses would invest in Chile because its laws favored business 
profitability. 
 
Individuals entering the workforce after 1981 were forced to deposit a portion of their 
pension into AFPs.  Borzutzky notes that there were three components to the privatize Social 
Security system.  First, the state subsidized the implementation of the new Social Security  
system; secondly, it reduced the amount of funds that the government would use to continue with 
the older system.  Finally, it reduced the reliance that employees could place on corporations in 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Papadopulos, "Politics and Ideas in Policymaking," 39. 
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order to receive retirement benefits. 46 The new system emphasized the need to place a higher 
reliance on the overall individual to take care of his social needs, and less reliance on 
government and businesses to protect workers.  Jose Pinera defended the transition to a 
privatized Social Security system by noting, "The new system "establishes a clear relationship 
between the personal effort and the reward" and "gives the individual the freedom of choosing 
and deciding."47 Thus, employees could no longer blame the government or their employers for 
their poor living standards or their inability to retire in part because they were now in control of 
their own retirement savings. 
The initial, privatization of pensions required all workers to pay a onetime 10% tax in 
order to finance the creation of the system.  Additionally the individual had to pay between 2.5% 
and 3.7% of their income to finance disability protection.  Borzutzky notes that currently 
individuals who use the privatized Social Security system pay approximately  19.5 to 20.7% of 
their wages in the privatized Social Security sector.  While some can argue that money is saved 
for retirement purposes, arguably this reduces the overall amount of money workers can use to 
achieve higher living standards, because they are deferring their overall wage payments until 
retirement.  While this may seem fiscally responsible Borzutzky notes, that individual's 
retirement savings are invested in government debt, as well as mutual funds in the stock market 
in order to help pensions achieve higher growth rate.48 The heavy amount of investment can 
 
create a bubble; if the debt is not paid, investors will lose a large percentage of their retirement 
savings.  Since, private pension funds are only required to hold a minimum of 1% of the total 
amount of funds value they manage workers savings are not guaranteed.  Thus, individuals 
would ask government to reimburse them for lost money in their private pension accounts. 
 
46 Borzutzky, "From Chicago to Santiago:" 663. 
47 Borzutzky, 663. 
48Borzutzky,  665 
Altman 17  
 
 
Workers are asked to invest their overall pensions in order to retire, but the notion that private 
savings should help individuals in retirement is questionable. 
The 1980 Chilean elections were crucial to the implementation of neoliberal policies 
regarding Social Security.  As Papadopulos notes, "1980 was a key year for the military.  The 
Chilean government felt most of the policy initiatives had to be stopped in order to concentrate in 
the political goal of winning the 1980 referendum in order to achieve legitimacy."49 As a result,, 
the Pinochet regime suspended its attempts to implement a more privatized Social Security 
because without legitimizing its own government, it could not legitimize the policies it wanted to 
implement.  On September 11, 1980, a referendum was held and Pinochet received 65.71 of the 
popular vote.  Papadopulos notes, "Both the armed forces and the neoliberal economists that work 
inside the government felt that the victory implied support for the institutionalization of 
that regime and for its neoliberal policies and technocrats."50   Thus, the established "legitimacy" 
 
of the Pinochet regime allowed the neoliberal technocrats to continue their plans for privatizing 
Social Security.  Furthermore, their plans for the creation of a new Social Security system would 
remain protected since the regime had minimized opposition to neoliberal policies.  As long as 
Pinochet remained in power, neoliberal advocates received support to privatize Social Security . 
 
During the 1980s, the neoliberal policies implemented under the Pinochet regime 
returned state growth to its previous economic levels prior to the coup and international analysts 
hailed this as the Chilean economic miracle.  According to Jorge Nef, the Pinochet regime 
reversed the government's highly influential position in the economic sector, and allowed private 
institutions to control economic production in the state.  Policies advocated by the economics 
department at the University of Chicago led to hiring, "the Chicago Boys" who were crucial in 
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the implementation of neoliberal reforms.  51 Even though these reforms have been widely 
praised and statistics have shown that Chile's economy continues to grow, evidence shows that 
with the implementation of neoliberal reforms, economic growth has only returned to its 
previous levels prior to the 1970s. As Patricio Silva notes, "[the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms] led to the acquisition by the middle and upper classes of very sophisticated patterns of 
consumption ... The majority of the Chilean population however did not participate in the 
benefits of this process of modernization because of the in-egalitarian nature of the economic 
model and the unwillingness of the economic team to implement redistributive models."52  While 
 
individuals in the upper middle and upper economic classes benefited from the privatization of 
Social Security, neoliberal reform did not improve social security conditions for people in lower 
economic classes. 
 
However, overall living conditions for lower class individuals remains poor.  According  
to Marcus Kurtz, "fiscal caution" was the primary economic message used after the Pinochet 
dictatorship.  Consequently, governments avoided spending high amounts of public revenue in 
order to improve Chileans living standards.  Kurtz notes, "Government transfer payments as a 
proportion of income dropped for all income quartiles [between 1987 and 1996] a decline of over 
50% for the very poorest...  Even under the center left governments, the relative importance of 
public assistance has not been maintained across time...  [Even with the economic miracle] the 
poor in Chile have only reestablished the living standards they had in 1970, while overall 
inequality has increased dramatically." 53   Thus, even with the implementation of neoliberal 
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reforms inequality remains and hinders the services that lower and middle-income Chileans can 
 
access. 
 
Chilean governments after the Pinochet regime have maintained his system of privatized 
Social Security.  Patricio Alwyin, the first democratically elected president after Pinochet, 
 
continued Pinochet's plans for privatized Social Security. 4 
 
This process continued because 
 
economic policies have created growth in Chile during and after the Pinochet regime. As a 
result, politicians hesitated to change his economic policies. 5 Kurt Weyland notes, "Chile's 
highly skewed income distribution, and crucial policy outcome has not improved since the 
transition to democracy.  The government's cautious approach and its reluctance to initiate 
conflicts with socioeconomic elites, especially private businesses ... impeded more determined 
redistribution, which might have come about through additional tax... and a revamping of Chile's 
inequitable private health and social security systems.  "56 Politicians remain fearful of alienating 
 
businesses which profit from the open market, and as result, congressional leaders as well as 
Presidents have been unwilling to significantly alter the current Social Security system.  The 
largest reforms were implemented under Michele Bachelet, in 2008, but even these reforms 
barely altered the current system.  She increased the number of individuals who were covered by 
government aid from 45 to 60% of those in the lowest economic classes.  However, her system 
modified the original system, but did not attempt to return to a public system.57 Thus, Chilean 
 
politicians have merely attempted to modify the system in order to improve it, but have not 
attempted to reverse its policies, because emphasis has remained on retaining business. 
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Problems: Pay as you go Systems and Private pension systems 
 
There are currently two implemented social security systems in the world today, the first 
is known 'as a Pay-as-You-Go System' (PAYGO) and the second, which is currently 
implemented in Chile is known as a private security pension fund.  While PAYGO is used 
internationally, Chile uses a private pension system.58  The difference between a private pension 
 
system and the PAYGO pension system are that under a Pay as You go System, individuals pay 
a certain percentage of taxes to the government each year, and receive retirement and Social 
Security benefits.  In contrast, privatized pension systems should allow the government to take a 
lesser role in the overall scheme of paying individual's pensions. 59   In Chile, an individual places 
a percentage of his income into a privatized Social Security fund which is managed by a private 
AFP which attempts to maximize the overall profitability of the money in the pension system.60 
In theory, this system should allow individuals to become less reliant on the government, and 
allow the government to use funds in order to address state needs. 
 
One of the major benefits in a PAYGO system is that retirees are able to receive 
government assistance when they retire if they do not have enough money to live at the median 
income.  Governments rely on workers to fund the system because the government uses revenue 
from the working population to aid retirees. 61   One of the benefits that workers can receive from 
using a pay-as-you-go system is the fact that they do not have to worry about losing their money 
in retirement.  Rather than investing their money, in potentially risky ventures, retirement 
savings is guaranteed by the government.62  Individuals who use PAYGO, especially retirees, are 
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able to access benefits, something that is more difficult in a private pension system.63 
Essentially, a public pay-as-you-go pension system ensures a much greater chance of having 
equality among all members of society rather than ensuring that only small groups of people are 
able to retire and live lifestyles above the median income. 
 
One of the problems with PAYGO is that a lack of contributions from the public sector 
forces the government to fund a greater percentage of the system . According to David Blake, 
"high labor requires high capital per worker , but net investment.. . has been inadequate: it has 
typically been considerably less than gross investment, and indeed , that investment by public 
sector corporations has frequently been negative. "64  If workers and companies are not funding 
 
the PAYGO system, the government has to spend more money in order to ensure that workers 
have enough money to retire.  According to David Blake,  "there has been a steady increase in 
unemployment in Europe over the last 40 years ...[The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development] OECD's explanation for this is that the service sector has failed to take up the 
workers released by the client manufacturing industry ... indeed within the European [economy] 
the net growth of employment has been entirely confined to the public sector, with no net 
additional private sector jobs created since 1973."65   The lack of employment in Europe after 
1973 essentially means that fewer people have the ability to contribute to the 'PAYGO' system . 
Furthermore, a key pillar to the system is weakened because the government is unable to draw 
funds from a key segment of the population in order to continue to provide public Social 
Security.  This forced the government to spend more of its own resources in order to make sure 
that the system continued to function. 
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Furthermore, critics argue that with a PAYGO system individuals save less because they 
know that the government will help them if they had not saved for retirement. According to the 
OECD, Chile's decision to switch from a public pension system to a privately funded one was 
successful because "it restored public confidence in pensions savings. "66Palau notes, "Domestic 
 
savings rate for the period  1981-2001 rose from 0.67% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP ... savings for 
higher income individuals increased.  Medium and low income individuals had an aggregate 
savings amount of 2.5% of GDP ."67 Overall increased savings from individuals contributed to 
greater economic growth.  Those who argue that individuals in the lower economic sectors still 
 
struggle to find employment thereby contributing to AFPs were challenged by findings which 
stated, "pension reform in Chile did result in a modest reduction in unemployment and... because 
of pension reform, and total employment grew between 1.3 and 3.7% in the formal sector." 68 
While the implementation of that private Social Security system created more jobs, it also created 
the opportunity for individuals to find jobs that allowed them to contribute to their privatized 
Social Security system. 
 
One of the biggest incentives with a privatized pension system such as Chile's, is that it 
allows workers to save their own money; this means that they can play a heavier emphasis in 
their own retirement.  According to Jose Pinera, "The [Pension Savings Account] PSA system 
solves the typical problems of pay as you go systems with respect to labor demographics: an 
aging population and the number of workers per retiree decreases.  Under the PSA system, the 
working population does not pay for the retired population."69 Individuals are able to save more 
 
of their own money for retirement.  More importantly, with an individualized pension system, 
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workers have the ability to determine how much they want to risk with their pensions system. 
Individuals have the opportunity to invest in high-risk pensions that return high amounts of 
money, or to invest in lower risk pensions that guarantee greater overall savings.70 The ability to 
determine which pension an individual chose also allowed him to determine and have more 
control over his retirement funds. 
 
The Private Pension 
 
 
The current pension plan in Chile has three main components.  The first is the mandatory 
savings funds, which requires workers to put a minimum of 10% of their overall salary into an 
AFP.  Individuals are allowed to change their pension provider every 6 months. 71 The second 
pillar is a government subsidy designed to help those who earn low wages and who may not be 
able to save enough in order to retire.  This was previously known as PASIS, but in 2008 was 
renamed the "Solidarity Fund" and was designed to provide more benefits to individuals in the 
lower economic classes.72 Finally, the third pillar is made up of voluntary pension contributions. 
Voluntary pensions allow individuals to place more than the required 10% of their income into 
pension accounts, thereby allowing them to receive tax benefits. 73 
 
Mandatory Savings 
 
 
"The underlying aim of the pensions scheme laid down in DL 3.500 (1980) is to ensure 
that workers who have finished their working life receive a stable income ... which bears a close 
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relation to that received during their active life."74 The objective of the pension system is to 
allow workers to enjoy the same standard of living they held prior to retirement.  Individuals 
place a portion of their income into individual and privately based pension funds.  The 
mandatory voluntary saving system involves a system of administrators whose function is to 
ensure that individuals who put their savings in the pension funds, receive their funds when they 
retire, and more importantly such administrators have the obligation to ensure that savings 
increases over time.  "Each member has an individual account in which his/her Social Security 
contributions are deposited.  These are capitalized and earn the yield on investments made by the 
administrators with the resources of the funds ..."75 While AFP's can increase an individual's 
overall savings, the system is not free; administrators in charge of monitoring the personal 
pension funds charge pension holders for managing their accounts. 
 
Even though the AFP industry is privatized, a state run regulatory board ensures that all 
pension holders receive the maximum benefits and acts as the last safety net for individuals who 
put money into AFP's.  The regulatory body is composed by members of the Undersecretary of 
Social Security's office.  Rather than allowing industry to regulate itself, the government plays a 
regulatory role ensuring that AFP's continue to function, properly while encouraging them to 
maximize profits for retirees. 76 Furthermore, the state plays an important role in ensuring that 
 
private pension companies have enough capital to pay retirees.  The state has to check the 
 
amount of capital in AFP corporations in order to ensure that they have the ability to give retirees 
their savings, without defaulting.  "If an administrator [of an AFP] fails to meet the minimum 
yield, once all other possibilities established in the law have been exhausted, the state will pay 
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the missing compensation ..."77 Thus, even though Chile has switched to a fully privatized 
system, there is still a large amount of involvement from the state, designed to ensure individual 
savings remain protected. 
 
Currently self-employed individuals are not required to use AFPs.  As a result, the self- 
employed, often "save" their retirement funds, but are unable to access retirement benefit from 
AFPs.  While approximately 1.7 million Chileans, report being self-employed, and do not 
contribute to the AFPs, evidence indicates that this population often works in the informal labor, 
and often receives the lowest amount of salary.78 Starting in 2012 a transition will occur in which 
the self-employed will gradually be incorporated into the private pension system.  By 2015, all 
self-employed individuals will be required to contribute to a private pension fund.  Mesa-Lago 
notes, "[the self-employed] will initially contribute 10% of 40% of their annual taxable income, 
increasing [to 10% of their entire income] by 2014. "79 This process occurs gradually, and does 
not immediately force them to contribute all of their earnings at once to an AFP.  Instead of 
taxing 10% of a person's total income, the overall amount of contributions they put into the AFP 
should gradually increase with both time and income ?, allowing lower income earners to use 
their incomes for other important factors. 
 
The government has to educate individuals in the informal sector about the AFP system. 
According to Mesa-Lago, "on average, self-employed members have less schooling, are older 
and have less social protection than workers in wage employment; those who have always been 
self-employed display much lower contribution density. "80 This segment needs to be targeted 
 
heavily because they are the most unfamiliar with the current privatized pension system, but 
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most reliant on state aid.  Mesa-Lagos notes, "The vast majority [of self-employed] hoped to 
receive state or family aid and had not thought about the future. "81 Evidently, these individuals 
know the least about the current pension system, and perceived failures may cause them to 
contribute less to it.  A population that was heavily reliant on government aid will be critical of 
the system that fails to provide them with equal benefits that they receive from government. 
Nevertheless, the 2008 reforms are designed to motivate individuals to contribute.  As Mesa- 
Lago notes, individuals who use the private funds and are self-employed will be eligible for 
increased government aid based on the overall income and contributions a family makes to the 
system.  As Mesa-Lago notes, individuals will be eligible for the "solidarity based top-up  
benefit. .. this consists of state financial assistance to supplement the contribution pensions of 
persons [over 65]." Thus, individuals need to be more informed about the possible benefits they 
can receive under the new programs.  82 
 
 
The military is currently the only organization that does not have privatized pensions.  Its 
influence, allowed it to stop the privatization of pensions for its members. 83 Even though Mesa 
Lago believes that it will be difficult for the military to retain its current pension system, because 
of declining in influence in the state, government expenses on military retirement packages was 
2 billion dollars in 2005.  Military members have little incentive to accept a privatized system, 
because their benefits will be diminished. 84 As Mesa-Lagos notes, "the armed forces which 
implemented [private pensions] excluded themselves from it, and have a separate scheme with 
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better pensions, mostly financed by the public purse." 85 The lack of a mandatory requirement to 
fund retirement, serves as a major incentive to remain dependent on the government. 
 
Social Assistance Pension (PASIS) 
 
 
The Social Assistance Pension (PASIS) was the second pillar in the privatized pension 
system it; targeted individuals in the lowest economic classes who did not have enough money to 
contribute to AFPs. 86 "Prior to the reform, the risk of poverty in old age was covered by two  
basic programs: Pension Minima Garantizada par el Estado (PMGE), which provided the floor  
for the pensions of those individuals with at least 20 years of contributions and PASIS for 
individuals without entitlement to pension from any pension system. "87 Viewed in this context, 
PMGE merely ensured that individuals had the minimum pension required, thereby minimizing 
the amount of aid the government needed to give.  The Pension Superintendence noted, "Once 
granted, PASIS could be received until the person died, provided that the requirements continue 
to be met.  The PASIS benefit was close to 50% of the minimum pension." 88 However, PASIS 
only targeted individuals who had the lowest amounts of income, but failed to aid individuals in 
the lower middle economic class, who had AFPs.  "An individual who had accumulated funds in 
his/her individual pension savings account and was not entitled to a PMGE would in principle 
have to deplete his/her funds before applying for a PASIS." 89 The government offered aid only 
when individuals depleted the funds in their AFPs.  Thus, those who were at the lowest levels of 
the economic classes continued to remain marginalized. 
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In 2008, both the PMGE and PASIS combined to form the Solidarity Fund.  The 
Solidarity Fund guaranteed, "All individuals in the least affluent 60% of the population [would] 
have access to a basic pension, regardless of their contributory record."90 The new system aimed 
to help individuals who had contributed to the private pension system, but who were excluded 
 
from government aid due to their use of AFPs.  Even though this group received aid from the 
government, the system provided minimal help for those who earned below median incomes. 
This group will only receive benefits once an individual turns 65.  Individuals still have to use 
their own money for other requirements such as health minimizing their overall ability to 
contribute more to the pension fund.  The authors of the Superintendencia de Pensiones (SAFP) 
note, "to avoid the high cost of a universal scheme, the benefits are focused on the poorest 60% 
of the population ... the amount of the benefit is withdrawn gradually, so that the final pension 
increases uniformly with the savings of each person."91 Those who contribute more will receive 
more benefits than those who contribute less.92 Thus, the overall goal remains to minimize the 
 
expenses that the government incurs. 
 
 
Voluntary Savings Account (AVPs) 
 
 
In 1987, a voluntary component was added to encourage individuals to contribute more 
than the required 10% to retirement funds.93 Similar to the mandatory system in the private 
pension fund, individuals can choose how much they put into the voluntary savings fund. 
"[Individuals] can make deposits, either regularly or not, and these are freely available, though 
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there is a limit of four withdrawals a year. 1194 Unlike the mandatory portion of the system , 
individuals have the ability to use their money in a more flexible manner allowing them to 
withdraw savings for other expenses . Nevertheless, the voluntary system is constrictive because 
individuals can only withdraw money from the account four times a year.  This limitation means 
individuals who have lower salaries one month and who have used the allotted withdrawal 
opportunities are forced to use their salary to pay for important expenses . Furthermore, 
individuals are charged a fee when they withdraw money from their voluntary savings account.95 
 
Fees are determined by "the real profit or loss in relation to the balance of existence at the date of 
the operation. 1196 The greater earnings an individual achieves, the more he is penalized and thus,  
is deterred from using the account for other purposes.  As Corripio notes, "The increase of 
benefits [in AVPs] increases participation in the system.  However, when these benefits mean 
greater costs, the final effect will depend on relative effects [for example income.] 1197 High 
growth rates in AVPs combined with high cost of withdrawing from AVPs may deter individuals 
from contributing to the system. 
 
However they are beneficial because they produce additional pension savings without 
promoting high-risk opportunities .98 Unlike AFP's, APVs have consistently returned high 
amounts of investment for individuals using the system.  Business News America reported , "[the 
APV industry] reported 4.63 billion dollar revenues and assets... up 36% to 2008 ..."99 After 
2002, APVs have grown consistently, and have not been subject to high rates of fluctuation. 
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Gonzalo Lira notes, in October 2008, during the financial crisis high risk AFPs lost 45% of their 
value  and moderate risks AFPs lost 14.25 percent of their value. 100 APV s were safer places to 
put savings in part because for the same period of time, and during the same year, they did not 
exhibit the same fluctuation or other required mandatory risks resulting in pension loss. 
 
Individuals as well as corporations, share the cost of contributing to a voluntary pension 
fund.  "The payment of the corresponding contributions is obligatory for persons employing 
domestic workers.  An amount equivalent to 4.11% of the monthly taxable wage must be paid by 
employers to the administrator at their own expense for a period of 11 years, this sum to be 
earmarked to finance compensation which will be payable in any event leading to the termination 
of the work contract. .."101 This requirement forces companies to contribute to the voluntary 
pension system and should give companies an extra incentive to keep their workers since they 
are paying for the employees benefits in the future.  Corporations benefit because their 
contributions are tax-deductible. 102 This encourages corporations as well as individuals to 
contribute to the AVPs.  Furthermore, in households where only one parent works, the 
contributions made by the company act as a supplement to the individual's own mandatory 
pension savings account in the event that the person cannot work.  The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes, "in the event of the worker's death [or 
firing], these contributions provide his/her family with a certain measure of Social Security 
cover...'o1°3 This means that family members can reduce their reliance on government aid. Thus, 
 
the voluntary pension system can be seen as a supplement to additional income for Chilean 
employees. 
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Nevertheless, individuals in higher economic classes, tend to contribute more to the 
voluntary fund, and as a result receive more benefits.  Table 2 .8 shows that individuals who 
earned 100,000 pesos per year [approximately $829] contributed the least to the pension system, 
while individuals who earned at least 1 million pesos or$ 2074.33  per year contributed more. 
Clearly, this is an insufficient amount of money for a family of four when considering other 
expenses. In this sense, it makes sense that a family earning this amount each year, would 
struggle to save for retirement. 104   Conversely, only a small minority, 120,000 people benefit 
 
from the current APV system.  "35% of APV savers have less than 10 million [pesos, 
approximately $20743.30 in their mandatory pension savings account, when considering the 
number of members in this category, only 1% of the group have a positive balance." 105 Clearly, 
the level of benefits is insufficient to the number of people who are using the program.  The lack 
of money combined with negative balances indicate that those with high incomes will have the 
ability to contribute more in order to minimize debts and thus will not be deterred by negative 
budgets, while those with less financial security, will be deterred because of negative account 
earnings.  This shows that those who are most likely to use AVPs are in the higher economic 
classes, and thus, AVPs fail to draw individuals from the middle class. 
 
Economic effects of AFPs 
 
 
The overall impact that AFPs had on Chile's economy, should not be ignored.  First, the creation 
of AFPs created a new industry that was unique to Chile, and therefore allowed it to profit from 
the industry's growth as it expanded into other countries.  Furthermore, the implementation of a 
private pension system made investing in Chile more appealing in part because corporations did 
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not have to account for large expenses due to strict labor laws in Chile.  Subsequently, they were 
able to save due to lack of requirements requiring them to contribute to pension systems. 
Finally, the overall ability to create an industry such as AFPs, allows the industry to expand and 
bring more revenue to Chile. 
 
The AFP pension system benefits companies because it reduces their overall costs. 
Borzutzky notes, "The 1980 legislation reformed both the financial and the administrative 
structures by eliminating the employer's portion of the [retirement fund] could be as high as 52% 
of the taxable wages. "106 Companies forced to pay close to half of their employees salary in 
 
overall Social Security benefits were forced to account for large amounts of costs in their own 
budgets , thereby hindering their growth . However, the elimination of a Social Security fund 
where companies paid for the Social Security benefits of their employees can be viewed 
positively.  Reduced company expenditures allowed businesses to save money and allowed them 
to develop further.  Furthermore, the minimization of additional costs for corporations in Chile 
made it more attractive to businesses.  Blake shows how the problem of individualized or 
company funded retirement programs affected economies globally.  He notes, "European unit 
labor costs are the highest in the world: they average $20 per hour (of which eight US dollars per 
hour covers the provision of social benefits).  In China, unit labor costs are one dollar per hour 
while in Africa they are one dollar per day.  Workers ...  [are] pricing themselves out of the 
formal labor market." 107 Markets are less attractive to companies because of the high expense 
 
costs, yet with an individualized pension system in states such as Chile; its market is more 
appealing, because it benefits businesses, which in turn creates more jobs. 
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Furthermore, companies also have the ability to develop in a state such as Chile, because 
private pension funds have created a new industry, in a state that was traditionally reliant on the 
production of raw materials . According to Marcus Porter and Arturo Condo, AFP Provida, one 
of the largest private pension funds in Chile, attempted to expand its business.  They note, "The 
firm participated in foreign markets both as an investor and as a supplier of technology. 
Technology transfer took two forms: hardware and software technology related to industry 
operations and managerial know-how." 108 Chile's ability to develop a service industry that had a 
comparative advantage within the region, allowed it to export its own technological services and 
profit in South America.  Instead of relying only on commodities like copper, the diversified 
economy benefited Chile because it allowed it to develop an industry that was not established in 
other parts of the world and thus allow Chile to profit from its expansion.  Furthermore, the 
authors note, then through the creation of private pension funds, AFP programs such as Provida 
"sought to grow rapidly and to seek new business that would increase the average income level  
of its members." 109 Provida's expansion benefited its investors and pension holders who received 
positive yields from the company's success outside the state.  The ability to expand its own 
 
operations outside of Chile allowed corporations to obtain a higher profit, and Chileans profited 
as Provida expanded and invested in other areas. 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the development of a service sector in Chile, reduced the reliance on 
foreign investments, and allowed Chileans to receive significant profits from other countries 
developments.  According to Tom Azzopardi, "advocates of the Chilean model note that one of 
its most remarkable effects has been its impact on the economy ...  One study has estimated that 
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a quarter of Chile's economic growth since 1981 [is based on which are in privatizes pension 
accounts]  The assets managed by the industry, which today reach just over US$60 billion, or 
close to two-thirds of GDP, created a new source of long-term finance." 11° Clearly, the 
development of the private pension fund has been a strong factor in Chile's economic growth. 
Furthermore, as economic growth continues, and AFPs in Chile are able to increase their overall 
 
value, they have the ability to reinvest and finance government debt.  While Silvia Borzutzky 
notes that private pension funds have fluctuated, and therefore are unstable in terms of funding 
the government she notes, "27.7% of AFP funds were invested in public debt securities... and 
28.17% was invested in the financial sector, 22.62% in shares and investment funds, and 21.83% 
was invested abroad." 111While a small portion was of savings did not contribute to Chile's 
economic development, a large portion has helped the Chilean economy because it has 
reinvested in it. 
 
While private pensions have failed to address the overall needs of people in the lower 
economic sectors, they have created more incentives for foreign businesses to enter Chile thereby 
creating jobs for the population.  Even though corporations do not pay 52% of a worker's 
benefits they are required to pay a minimum of 4.11% of a worker's salary in order to contribute 
to the workers retirement fund.  As a result, workers accept the majority of responsibility for 
retirement, but businesses are still held accountable.  Furthermore, the implementation of the 
privatized social security sector, indirectly led to the growth of an industry in Chile.  In this 
sense, while Chile was reliant on the production of raw materials such as copper to fuel its 
economy, the decision to implement a privatized social security sector allowed Chile to diversify 
its economy.  This has led to increased economic growth and has allowed Chile to export its 
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systems to other countries.  While the system may have diminished workers rights, it has 
strengthened the overall economy in Chile.  Nevertheless, the system needs to be modified to 
address the economic needs of individuals in the lower economic classes. 
Doubts about the AFP system in Chile 
 
 
Even though Chile's implementation of Ahorros Fondos de Previsionales (AFPs) has 
been supported by international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Raul Madrid notes that individuals who use AFPs are unlikely to receive better 
benefits than they received under the previous system known as the Fondos Previsionales.  Raul 
Madrid notes, "pension privatization schemes are costly in the medium term because they allow 
(or oblige) members of the Social Security system to transfer some portion of their Social 
Security contributions to private pension funds." 112 Individuals who were forced to shift their 
 
savings from the public system to a private system had to pay 10% tax in order to help fund the 
newly formed privatized pension companies. 113 As Madrid states, "Where as the transition costs 
of pension privatization are quite large for countries with high current public pension 
expenditures; they are considerably smaller for countries with low public pension 
expenditures." 114 Since Chile had a highly funded social welfare system, the transition was 
 
costly.  The initial workers did not benefit from the implementation of a private pension system, 
because they were taxed to create a fully privatized one.115 
 
Nevertheless, AFP supporters, argue that a privatized system, allows the state to maintain 
a fiscally balanced budget.  They argue this allows the government to use resources in a way to 
develop the economy.  Supporting the argument that private pension funds are an effective way 
112 Raul Madrid, "Economic Pressures, and Pension Privatization," 28 . 
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114 Madrid, "Economic Pressures, and Pension Privatization," 42. 
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to allow individuals to control their own social healthcare costs is that "between 1982 and 2000, 
the pension funds generated returns averaging 10.9% annually above inflation." 116 While this 
statistic indicates that Chileans are being rewarded with the implementation of AFPs, and 
therefore higher returns on pension should encourage Chileans to invest more of their money, 
studies have shown that even with high return rates Chileans are generally unwilling to put large 
amounts of money in their pension fund.  According to authors Marcus Madrid, and Alberto 
Arenas de Mesa, David Bravo, Jere Bherman, Olivia Mitchell, and Petra Todd, "overall, self- 
reported contribution months exceed the administrative data count by 20%, no doubt in part due 
to recall error."117 The tendency to over report the amount of months and earnings placed into 
pensions challenges previous thoughts, which claimed the amount of money put into their 
pensions, would increase with a privatized system.  This shows that Chileans are using more 
money on other issues rather than retirement. Thus,  it will be difficult for the state to maintain a 
balanced budget, if individuals are not contributing sufficient amount of money to privatized 
pension systems. 
 
The transition to a private pension fund increased Chilean government debt.  According 
to Raul Madrid , transition costs to a private pension system," are particularly large for [some] 
countries because they tend to have a greater number of retirees whose pensions must continue to 
come from the state after the pension system is privatized." 118 As the number of Chilean retirees 
increased, they collected their pensions from the state.  However, as they withdrew their savings, 
and individuals switched to the private system, the state continued to lose funds necessary to 
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fund retirees. 119   Chile compounded this problem by encouraging workers who had held jobs 
prior to 1981 to switch their funds from the public system to a private one.  Individuals were 
employed for the first time after 1981 had to enroll in the private pension system. 120 In essence, 
by encouraging individuals to adopt the privatized system, the Chilean government was 
minimizing the number of people who were necessary to contribute to retiree funds.  As David 
Blake notes, "the introduction of a funded system creates what is known as a transition deficit  
this has to be financed by extra taxation or by the issue of recognition bonds by the government. 11 
121 Proponents who claimed that the implementation of a privatized pension system reduced 
costs, especially in the short to medium term, failed to admit the government would incur greater 
 
costs with the implementation of a privatized system. 
 
Neoliberals believed the transition to a private Social Security sector reduced government 
waste, while allowing the free market to determine prices of AFPs ensuring that the individual 
received the highest benefits from AFPs.  As Marcus Porter and Arturo Condor note, "intense 
competition and modifications and regulations ... forced AFP 1s to continuously improve and 
extend their services at ever lower fees... the regulations designed to ensure sales force integrity 
and reduce account churning, resulted in... a sharp reduction in account transfers. "122 While 
 
Porter and Condor stressed increased competition and reduced costs of AFP 1s, Borzutzky shows 
that, in the old system, the CF, individuals entitled to disability payments received $231,720. 
Conversely, under a fully funded private pension system individuals received $143,966.  Overall 
coverage for the disability sector, an area that the private pension system was supposed to help 
did not provide individuals with significant benefits.  As Porter and Condor note, "the four 
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largest AFP's contend for about 80% of funds under management and 90% of industry profits in 
1999."123 Clearly, a majority of AFP providers vie to get services from the population, which is 
not disabled.  Minimal competition in some areas of the private pension sector show a fully 
privatized system, has not provided competition and benefits for all Chileans, this is a major 
reason why the government continues to fund disability services. 
While pension funds reduced business costs, workers had to save for their own 
retirement, but contributed less to privatized systems.  According to Silvia Borzutzky, in the 
1980s, the overall value of wages decreased and by 1985, the true value of wages was 13% 
below the true value of wages in 1970. During this time private pension, funds returned an 
approximate increase of 13.8% of the overall pension fund per year.  "Between 1990 and 1998 
the real value of wages increased by 35% but the average investment yield decreased to 10.3%. 
The yield has been quite unstable oscillating from 28.6% in 1991 to 11.6% in 1998."124 The 
 
fluctuation of wages in the early 1980s made corporations more profitable because they were not 
paying a large share of workers social costs.  While wages increased in the 1990s allowing 
workers to put more income into their AFPs Borzutzky notes, the fluctuating pension returns 
deterred Chileans from saving more of their retirement money and thus they missed the 
opportunity to increase their savings.  When salaries decreased, Chileans saved less of their 
earnings and when  salaries increased, pension returns decreased.  Thus, Chileans were unable to 
increase their savings. 
Those with less money in their AFP accounts workers are more reliant on the government 
for financial aid. As Mesa et al note, the current Chilean pension system has "a noncontributory 
public system that provides welfare-based pensions [Solidarity Fund] for the indigent.  The 
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system is means tested and is operated centrally [and determines Solidarity Fund] benefits." 125 
Remaining government-funded programs indicate that the Chilean government continues to use 
taxpayer dollars in order to fund the system.  The state has not been able to allow the private 
sector to administer social welfare for its entire population; as a result the government has not 
been completely free to use funds in another manner to help Chile's economy.  Critics of poor 
government spending must recognize that the current benefits that individuals receive from the 
Solidarity Fund are not substantial.  Borzutzky notes, that individuals who have low pensions 
and low salaries remained reliant on government aid, but did not receive adequate services to 
address their needs.  She notes , "The effects of the high costs of the commissions are not limited 
to the retiree.  They also have a sizable effect on the fiscal budget because the state provides 
minimum pensions when the accumulated funds are not sufficient to provide a pension. 126 
 
Contrary to the neoliberal thought, the government remains an important player in the 
distribution of funds to individuals in lower economic sectors. 
Perceptions of AFPs 
 
Even though Chile implemented mandatory private savings in the 1980s, the overall 
perception of the system will determine its future success.  One of the biggest challenges it faces 
is the lack of knowledge Chileans have about it.  Alberto Mesas et al note, "we posit that those 
better informed about their pensions are more likely to make sensible provisions for old age, 
possibly by contributing more and paying more attention to plan investments and making 
appropriate payout options." 127  A more informed population, should be able to maximize its 
 
overall returns in their private pensions, Nevertheless, the authors note that "as AFP participants 
pay little attention to investment costs, it is likely that AFP's will not need to compete amongst 
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themselves to drive down prices and enhance service... fewer than 2% of the respondents knew 
either the fixed or variable commissions in either year." 128  Borzutzky noted that the lack of 
competition between pension organizations, forced the government to intervene and act as a 
regulator in order to ensure that individuals receive the most amount of benefits from their AFP. 
The lack of knowledge that individuals have about the system, suggests that they simply put their 
money into the retirement fund, but do not monitor their funds.  This is problematic because 
individuals lack knowledge to adequately plan for retirement. 129 The attempts to implement a 
privatized Social Security system designed to increase overall individual involvement, has not 
lead to more responsible individual retirement planning. 
Survey 
 
While studies by Arenas de Mesa, show that a majority of Chileans are uninformed about 
the pension system, the current retirement system remains. 130 Many Chileans continue to support 
the current system indicating that they see as the most viable solution to their current Social 
Security issues.  Increased support for the system with minimal knowledge about it suggests that 
if pensions do not return the same amount of value that they had been returning, many Chileans 
will question the overall benefits the system provides.  Nevertheless, the evidence conducted in 
the reviews here suggests that Chileans in the middle and lower economic sectors, continue to 
support the process in part because it is the only system today are familiar with.  By 
understanding Chileans perceptions of the system and understanding their disappointment with 
the system, it seems more likely that policymakers would likely alter the system in order to make 
it more appealing to more individuals.  Chileans opinions about the system have the ability to 
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help policy makers alter policy in order to gain more support from the public, thereby reducing 
the chances that the public demands a complete overhaul of the current system. 
In order to understand Chilean's perspective towards their private pension system, I 
interviewed employed Chileans whose ages ranged from 18 to 60. This age rage was important 
because the Chilean population has the ability to retire at the age of 65 for males, and 60 for 
females. 131 By using this age demographic, my goal was to determine the perceptions of savings 
held by individuals in a younger age demographic compared to an older demographic.  Below 
are the questions I asked my respondents. 
 
1) Tienes un Ahorro de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? Cuál es el nombre de la empresa 
de su AFP? Do you  have an Ahorro  de Fondos Previsional  (AFP)? what 
company do you use? 
2) Aproximamiento cuanto ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ano? [approximately 
how much does your job  pay you  each month?  Year? 
3) Que  porcentaje de su sueldo pones en tu AFP? What percentage of your salary do 
you 
 
put into your AFP? 
 
4) i,Guardas, mucho de tu dinero en su AFP? Do you save a lot of your salary and put  
it 
 
into your AFP? 
 
5) Cual son los incentivos para ti para poner tu dinero en una AFP?  What are the 
incentives for  putting your  salary  into an AFP 
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6) Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en una AFP? Puedes explicar si o 
no?  What are the reasons that you would  prefer  to put  less of your salary into an AFP?  
Could you please  explain your  reasons? 
7) Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en tu fondo previsional? Has puesto más dinero en tu 
AFP antes o después de las tenias 30 anos Porque hay una diferencia en la cuenta? How 
many months have you  contributed  to your AFP? did you put  more money in your AFP  
before or after you  turned 30. 
8) Antes de las AFP's, usaste el sistema publica para obtener beneficios y jubilar? Que 
prefieres mas el sistema de antes de 1980 o los AFP's? Porque? (Depende en la edad de 
la trabajador) Before the implementation of AFPs did you use the old provisional 
system (PAYGO)? do you prefer the AFP system over the old system? [note this is age 
dependent and also dependent on when the individual started working] 
9) Puedes explicar el tipo de AFP tienes. Por ejemplo hay muchos riesgos con su AFP, por 
ejemplo muchas inversiones que podrían darte beneficios o también problemas? 0 
prefieres los AFP que no tienen muchas inversiones, pero también producen menos 
riesgos y beneficios? Porque escogiste tu tipo de AFP? Could you please  explain the 
type of AFP you have? For example are you required to take a lot of risks with your 
AFP  in order to receive a lot of benefits? Or do you have a more moderate AFP  
system,  which allows you  to take fewer  risks but also allows you  to receive fewer 
benefits? 
 
 
 
10) Has perdido un trabajo? Durante el tiempo que no tenía trabajo ponías dinero en tu 
fondo previsional? Usaste dinero en su fondo previsional durante el tiempo que no 
Altman 43  
 
 
tenia trabajo? Have you lost a job?   During this time did you put money into your 
retirement fund? Did you use any money in your retirement fund  to help you when you 
did not have a job? 
11) Que información tiene sobre su AFP? 
 
 
what do you know about the AFP plan you have? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chile, all workers except self-employed individuals are forced to have AFPs. 
Questions 1 and 2 were important because they allowed me to learn which income group used 
certain AFP providers.  One of the most important determining factors which will help determine 
whether private pension systems are viable in Chile is the amount of money individuals save. 
Question 5 is important because similarly to question four individuals who do not have an 
incentive to save for retirement, will rely on the government for financial aid.  Similarly, 
questions six and seven, attempts to understand why individuals may have saved more after the 
age of 30.  Rationale suggests that after the age of 25, incomes rise, but age can also determine a 
person's willingness to save.  Therefore, simply claiming that jobs lead to overall savings may 
not be sufficient to explain increased savings. Question 8 is important because before 1980 there 
was a government-funded Social Security program.  This question shows the overall likeliness 
that individuals save for retirement with government aid.  Since there are various type of AFP 
pensions in Chile, individuals have the ability to determine the overall amount of risk they want 
to encounter when investing into an AFP. In addition, age as well as 
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Income should play an important role in determining the overall risks individuals are willing to 
take.  If individuals accept high risks, with little money in their AFP's, and encounter heavy 
losses they will have to make up their losses.  Similar to the survey conducted by Mesa et al, I 
also attempted to determine and learn how much individuals knew about their AFPs. 132 
The first person I interviewed regarding their experience with the AFPs, was a 20-year- 
 
old female, who was a single mother and who lived with her parents.  In order to continue her 
education, she had used loans, and worked during the day.  This respondent represented the 
second-generation AFP users who have begun to use the system in their early 20s.  Respondent 
number one noted that she selected Habitat to invest her savings because of its low price and low 
management costs.  She noted she only saved the required 10% of her income, because "putting 
in more than the minimal amount was unnecessary." 133 This indicates that she wanted to use her 
money in other manners besides saving.  While she noted that she would put more than the 
required 10% of her salary into the AFP if her overall job paid her more, her initial response 
challenges private pension supporters claims that private investment encourages individuals to 
save more for retirement.  Respondent one indicates that with her current salary, she is be 
unlikely to put more of her salary into the overall retirement fund because it would reduce her 
ability to spend money on other necessities.  In this sense, respondent one is the prototypical 
response to the implementation of a privatized system, but also gives supporters of the system 
the opportunity to note that individuals have the ability to determine how much of their overall 
incomes they save. Nevertheless, her saving habits indicate that retirement may be much easier 
for individuals who are able to save more and put more into their AFPs at an earlier age. 
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One of the major factors that will determine the overall success for the continued private 
pension system is the overall amount of support it receives from second-generation users.  At this 
current point in time, while the second-generation seems to support the system, their inability to 
contribute indicates that if their wages do not increase, they will have less incentive to 
contribute to the AFPs.  While respondent two noted that he puts the mandatory 10% into the 
savings account, when asked why he did not put in more, he noted "No Ponia mas en mi AFP, 
porque juntaba dinero para pagar el ultirpo semester de mi carrera en mi Universidad.  [I didn't 
put more money into my AFP because I was collecting money to pay for my final semester of 
college.]" 134 This comment relates to the overall tangible feeling that pension users have towards 
 
the overall system.  Education is more highly valued consideration than putting money into a 
pension plan.  However, spending towards education may t hurt the overall individual in part 
because the system is set up to encourage continuous retiring savings, and thus, when this does 
not occur individuals become more reliant on higher salaries or working longer hours in order to 
make up for the lack of contributions to the system they missed in the early years. 135 
 
The second respondent's overall lack of knowledge about his current pension system, 
indicated that he was not consistently tracking the overall gains his company reported. 
Respondent two noted, " es que escogi6 mi AFP fue el contador de la empresa donde yo comencé 
a trabajar, estoy totalmente desinformado de los riesgos y beneficios de cotizar en mi 
AFP." 136[My employer chose my current AFP for me, I am completely uninformed about the 
 
risks and benefits that I can collect in my AFP.]  The lack of knowledge he had about his AFP 
provider indicated that he was not constantly monitoring the benefits and risks that his company 
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used in order to increase his pension.  His lack of knowledge about the risks meant, that if his 
pension holder lost part of his savings, he would have to work longer in order to recover the 
savings.  Furthermore , he may not be putting appropriate amounts of investment into his AFP in 
order to increase his earnings. 137 Employers who choose pension plans for their employees, must 
 
be forced to explain all the benefits and risks that employees receive with the company provided 
plan.  A more informed investor is likely to save more effectively and be better prepared for 
retirement. 138 This respondent noted that in the future, the next time he changes his pension plan 
he is more likely to research all pension plan opportunities.  Nevertheless, based on his results, 
this will be heavily reliant on the overall amount of time he has to determine which pension fund 
is best, and thus, his selection will play an important role in his overall ability to retire. 139 
 
The third respondent differed from the first two because he was in his early 50s, and had 
put money into his AFP for over five years.  While the authors of the SAFP noted individuals 
from 35 to 50, were more likely to put more funds into AFP's, as well as AVPs, respondent 3 
challenges these findings. 140 He noted, "Ahorra estoy pusiendo el mínimo en mi AFP. No estoy 
como un empleado. Ahorra, estoy como un trabajador independiente. Es muy difícil para mí a 
poner mas que 10% de mi sueldo en un AFP porque mi sueldo es fijo."141 [Note independent 
workers do not have to put money into AFPs].  [Right now I am putting the minimum in my AFP . 
I am not an employed worker, right now I am like an independent worker.  It is very difficult 
 
for  me to put more than 10% of my salary into an AFP, because it is fixed  [and it is low} "142 The 
small amount of salary that he is earning at this current point in time is barely enough to 
 
137 Mesa et al, "The Chilean Pension Reform turns 25," 17 
138 Mesa et al, 17. 
139 Mesa et al, 17.. 
140 Bernstein et al, "The Old System,"  in  Chile 2008: A Second Generation Pension Reform, Superintendence of 
Penson,30 
141 Respondent 3 
142 Respondent  3. 
Altman 47  
 
 
contribute to the pension fund.  He noted that the amount he puts into his AFP prevents them 
from contributing any money to an AVP.  This supports the findings of the SAFP, which found 
that individuals who put in more of their savings into APVs tended to have higher incomes. 143 
The overall system fails to benefit many middle-income workers and as a result should be seen 
 
as a precursor to second-generation users in the sense that individuals who become self- 
employed and are not making large amounts of money, may struggle to contribute to the AFP 
and thus, may not have sufficient funds to contribute to AVPs. 144 
Nevertheless, Chileans like the current AFP system this is ironic because many of the 
 
respondents were receiving minimal salaries, and the benefits they received remain small.  This 
would suggest that Chileans would find the system inequitable.  However, individuals believe 
that even the risks that they are required to take, their pension accounts have high growth rates 
and remain relatively stable.  Respondent 3 noted, "Mira, tenía que poner mi sueldo en una AFP. 
Me gustan los AFPs. ..Cuando comiencen los AFP fueron regulados. El control es bueno de los 
AFPs, nose como otras seria funciona." 145 [Look, I had to put my salary in an AFP. I like the 
 
AFPs ...When they began the AFPs were regulated.  The regulation of AFPs is good.  I don't 
know how another system would work other than with AFPs.]  Chileans see the system as 
relatively stable, and furthermore, as respondent three notes, many do not see an alternative to 
the current system.  While the respondent noted, "Mi papa me dijo que el recibi6 mas beneficios 
del sistema antigua que los trabajadores reciben de los trabajadores hoy. [My father told me he 
received more benefits from the old system, than the workers receive from the system today. 
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146 
]" 
 
Even though, this suggests that the overall benefits individuals receive need to be improved 
 
to provide services equivalent to the older system, evidence clearly indicates that with the older 
system, large amounts of government inefficiency led to overall state debt.147 Thus, it seems 
unlikely that politicians will support a return to the previous form of Social Security pension 
systems.  It is more likely to implement reforms designed to help individuals and lower classes 
save more effectively for retirement. 
Clearly, respondent number four differed from the initial ones in part because of his 
ambivalence towards the current privatized system.  Unlike the other respondents, respondent 
number four was retired, but he highlighted the difficulty in obtaining a high pension in order to 
retire for individuals who were not professionals.  He noted,  individuals such as lawyers, 
doctors, other professionals, benefited from the system, but the overall population did not  
benefit . He noted: 
 
"Es imposible obtener la cantidad porque tienes que ser un profesional. Tienes que ser, un 
doctor, abogado etc. Y también no me gusta el sistema porque tengo que pagar una 
administrador guardar mi dinero. No es justo, y tambien, si hay una crisis como que 
ocurri6 en 2008, muchas personas perdieron su dinero para jubilar, pero los AFPs no 
dieron dinero. En mi opinion hay demasiados riesgos. No, no me gusta el sistema." 148 [It 
 
is impossible to obtain the necessary amount in order to retire, you have to be a 
professional.  You have to be a doctor, lawyer, etc.  In addition, I don't like the system 
because I have to pay an administrator to watch my money.  It's not fair, and if there is a 
crisis occurs like the one that occurred in 2008 many people lost their retirement funds, 
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but the AFPs did not give them back all their retirement savings.  In my opinion, there are 
too many risks.  I DON'T LIKE THE SYSTEM (emphasized)]. 
 
Unlike the previous respondents, who were un-concerned about losing their savings, this 
respondent, showed a  lack of knowledge that the previous respondents had about the current 
system.  While all noted that they were happy with the service and benefits, they receive from 
the system, none noted that they were worried about losing pension savings, and as respondent 
four shows, individuals should be worried about the overall accountability that AFPs have in part 
because they are not required to return peoples' lost savings.  Clearly, the individuals who have 
the most to lose from the system, are nonprofessionals, who put in the required 10%, but do not 
have significant funds in AFPs. 149 In this sense, these individuals pay the highest prices for 
 
AFP's, in part because of their administrative charges and because of the lack of accountability 
their companies have in terms of overall savings. 
 
While it is easy to argue for a return to the prior system, it is important to note that the 
overall amount of government inefficiency was the main point, which led to the transformation 
to a privatized system. 150 While the transition to a privatized system, has forced individuals to 
become more self-sufficient and less reliant on government aid, reducing government 
 
expenditure, inequality still exists.  In order to rectify the current system, respondent 4 noted: 
 
 
"me gusta la idea que personas tienen que guardar su dinero, pero ahorra no es justo 
porque muchas personas quien estan trabajando, estan recibiendo el sueldo mínimo. 
Entonces, es muy difícil para jubilar. Ahora aquí el sueldo bajo es dos mil y quinientos 
pesos. No es suficiente para guardar los en los AFPs y también usar dinero pero otras 
 
149 Respondent 4 
150 Borzutzky "From Chicago to Santiag,"657 
Altman 50  
 
 
casas. Silos trabajadores reciban mas sueldo sería diferente porque tenía mas 
oportunidades para poner sus sueldos en AFPs." 151 
 
[I like the idea that people have to save their earnings but right now it is not fair because 
people are receiving the minimum wage.  Thus, it is very difficult for them to put 
portions of their salary in order to retire in part because they need to use it for other 
things.  If workers received higher salaries, it would be different because they would have 
more opportunities to put their savings into AFPs] 
 
Respondent four provides a reasonable solution to the current system in Chile.  It would be more 
difficult, to completely revamp the system, but if individuals have higher salaries, they would 
have more money to contribute to the AFPs.  All previous respondents noted that if they had 
greater salaries, they would be willing to contribute more in order to save for retirement. 
Nevertheless, one of the reasons that individuals at this current point in time lack the ability to do 
so is the overall fact that low salaries combined with high prices for other products, diminish 
their ability to contribute. 152 Government intervention is necessary in order to increase overall 
 
working salaries for individuals in the middle class giving them a greater opportunity to 
contribute to voluntary pension funds.  This  may be the most legitimate solution to the current 
problem in Chile, but this also will be dependent on businesses willingness to pay workers higher 
salary wages, and politicians willingness to alienate businesses in the state. 
 
Searching for  Solutions 
 
Privately funded pension do not provide the greatest amount of benefits to Chileans.  The 
Chilean government has implemented a hybrid system, where it helps individuals with lower 
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pensions, receive adequate standards ofliving in retirement.  Ex-president, Michele Bachelet 
implemented the most aggressive reforms, in 2008, when she signed legislation that gave 
individuals in lower income brackets, more aid from the government.  Eduardo Gallardo notes, " 
The new $2 billion-a-year program will expand public pensions to groups left out by private 
pensions - the poor and self-employed, homewives, street vendors and farmers who saved little 
for retirement- granting about a quarter of the nation's work force public pensions by 2012." 153 
 
This decision to implement increased government aid, diverges from the previous trends 
implemented under Pinochet and following presidents who placed a large burden of savings on 
individual workers.  Individuals have struggled to contribute to the retirement plan, but increased 
government aid combined with the private system allows individuals who saved to receive 
increased aid from the government, if their personal savings is minimal.  Estelle James noted, 
"Public pensions alone won't do, because governments are not able to finance them , while 
private accounts can leave people out."154 Furthermore, individuals who save will be rewarded 
 
with government support and thus will have an extra incentive to save because they know that 
the government is representing their interests. 
While the current pension system only provides aid to individuals once they have AFPs, 
individuals would be more likely to save if they knew that the government would provide them 
with aid for social costs.  Carmela Mesa- Lago notes, "If the households income does not reach 
the ceiling per capita, each adult member may receive a basic, non-contributory pension, so that 
two adults in the family unit may receive the benefit even though the households might not be 
amongst the poorest." 155   Government subsidies act as an additional support pillar for those 
 
individuals who have to spend money on other expenses such as health thereby reducing their 
 
 
153 Eduardo Gallardo, Chile's Private Pension System adds Public Payouts for  Poor. New York Times. 
154 Estelle James cited in. Chile's Private Pension System adds Public Payouts for  Poor. New York Times 
155 Mesa-Lago "Social Protection in Chile," 392. 
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ability to contribute to the overall pension fund. 156   Thus, individuals in these situations, are not 
punished for their lack of contributions at the minimal level.  Mesa-Lago notes, "There will be 
incentives...  [individuals who do not contribute] will not receive the certificate of documents 
needed for certain legal procedures and will not qualify for tax exemptions on credits." 157 The 
system encourages individuals to first fund their own policies, but willingly gives aid to those 
who attempt to save, but may not be able to contribute enough to savings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, individuals are deterred from putting money into savings accounts because they fear 
they are losing it for other necessary purposes, such as health costs.  "Individuals responding to 
the importance of needs ranked health as the most important, receiving 39% of the votes, 
housing as the second most important, receiving 27% of the votes, and education as the third 
most important, receiving 26%." 158   Individuals clearly place a higher emphasis on the potential 
need to pay for health costs than saving for retirement.  The costs of health encourage individuals 
 
to save their money in order to receive its benefits.  Retirement must be seen as a medium-term 
prospects rather than a long-term one.  In order to do this, governments must understand  
individual's priorities.  At this current point in time individuals pay for health expenses 
independent from their current pension funds. 159 However, Corripio notes that 35% of the 
respondents in his survey noted, "health benefits would be an incentive to additional 
contribution." 160 He stated only 4% of individuals claimed tax incentives were a motivating 
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157 Mesa-Lago, "Social Protection in Chile," 394. 
158 Corripio Creating Incentives for Voluntary Contributions to Pension Funds by Independent Workers 43. 
159 Corripio, Creating Incentives for Voluntary Contributions to Pension Funds by Independent Workers 49 
16
° Corripio, 49. 
Altman 53  
167
 
 
factor that encouraged them to contribute more to AVPs. 161 Individuals are unlikely to feel the  
tax effect immediately when they contribute more money to the system, because it happens 
annually. 162 Conversely, health is more relevant because individuals feel significantly affected by 
the costs each time they use it, because it reduces their salary. 163 In order to encourage 
individuals to contribute more money to the voluntary Social Security savings program , there 
need to be more tangible rewards. 164 
Finally, if the government is going to reduce reliance on government aid, it must 
implement laws that increase workers' salaries.  In 2007, one year before Michele Bachelet 
implemented her Social Security reforms, minimum wage was US $288 per month. 165 Currently, 
minimum wage is US $310 per month.  The current amount that workers receive is significantly 
low and hinders their ability to put large portions of their salary into private pensions.  166 In 
 
2007, workers wanted a wage increase in part because of their inability to purchase food.  Evelyn 
Mathei noted, "If one considers the high inflation, one can understand that the increase [in 
wages) could not have been any lower.  Chileans have lost a lot of purchasing power." 167 If 
Chileans are unable to purchase the current necessary goods in order to survive, they are even  
less likely to contribute to pension funds.  In Chile, "a very nice, fully furnished studio apartment 
in a good neighborhood can be found for as little as $400  per month." 168 Individuals who want 
to live in safe neighborhoods, have to make a decision: do they contribute less to pensions in 
 
order to have higher standards of living, or do they save for retirement and sacrifice living 
standards.  Workers receiving minimum salary, and by contributing 10% of their salary to AFPs 
161 Corripio
, 
49
.
 
162 "The Chilean Income Tax System"http://www.sii.cllaprenda _sobre_impuestos/estudios/sistemrenta_ingles .htm 
163 Corripio,51. 
164 Corripio, 51. 
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would lack sufficient funds to live in a safe neighborhood and contribute to AFPs.  Chileans 
want both of these and those statistics show, housing is ranked very important. 169 The 
government must increased overall wages in order to allow individuals to live in safe 
neighborhoods and contribute to pensions.  Thus, an appropriate salary is crucial if the current 
privatized system is going to succeed. 
 
Arguably, the government must support business interests and allow minimum wage 
practices or, it must intervene and increase overall salaries allowing more individuals to 
contribute to AFP's reducing reliance on government funding but possibly risk losing foreign 
investment. At this current point in time, the government's evidence response suggests that 
emphasis continues to be placed on attracting business rather than on helping workers save for 
retirement. 170 By reducing corporations responsibilities, the state government has placed a 
 
majority of the responsibility on workers who have insufficient funds. Lacking in sufficient 
funds, workers will continue to rely on government aid in order to retire. 171 Thus, the neoliberal 
philosophy has not reduced government dependence and has not created a system that allows 
individuals to save their money and retire. In this sense, the system is contradictory because it 
requires large amounts of income in order for it to succeed. Conclusively the system requires 
individuals to rely on government aid in a similar manner that occurred under PAYGO 
systems. 172 
 
 
The shift to a neoliberal advocated economic policy was supposed to reduce overall 
government influence in the social sphere allowing it to spend money more efficiently in other 
 
 
169 Corripio, {(Creating Incentives for Voluntary Contributions to Pension Funds by Independent Workers," 49 
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areas thereby developing the Chilean economy. However, this has not occurred. While 
neoliberalism claims that businesses have the ability to make economies more efficient, thereby 
strengthening economic growth and minimizing government expenditures, Michelle Bachelet's 
reform plan shows the inherent problems in a purely neoliberal market oriented policy. Rather 
than reducing government aid in the overall public sphere, and leaving it to the "efficiency'' of 
corporations, strong evidence shows that neoliberalism continues to force governments to accept 
heavy burdens to satisfy public needs. The $2 billion Social Security program that Michele 
Bachelet implemented in 2008, shows that the transition to a privately funded system, still 
requires heavy assistance from the federal government in order to achieve success. 173 
 
Furthermore, the overall efficiency that neoliberalism promised in terms of improving standards 
of living must also be questioned. 174 If the government has to use its own resources in order to 
address the needs of individuals in the lowest socioeconomic sectors, then the promises that 
neoliberalism has advocated must merely be seen as promises given to a minority of the 
population but which fail to address the needs of the entire population. In this sense, the 
implementation of the neoliberal reforms in the shift to a neoliberal policy, did not benefit the 
Chilean government or its population. 
 
Clearly, the interviews indicate that the attempts to encourage  Chileans to save more 
money have been ineffective. Respondent one's answers to my questions could highlight many 
young Chileans perceptions of mandatory savings. In this sense, they saved because it is 
required, but show little ability or desire to increase their savings.175 If individuals are not 
 
focused on retirement, but rather on other expenses such as providing food for their families, or 
 
 
 
173 Eduardo Gallardo, Chile's Private Pension System adds Public Payouts for  Poor . New York Times. 
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continuing their education evidence clearly shows Chileans will continue to contribute minimum 
amounts of their salary in order to pay for other expenses which they believe are necessary in 
order to improve their standards ofliving. 176 In the interview process, it is important to highlight 
the overall personal feelings individual's have towards the current system. While many 
respondents looked at the system is boring, and uninteresting to discuss, only respondent three 
took a different attitude in favor of the system. However, even he noted that it was difficult for 
him to contribute more than the minimum requirement to his retirement fund indicating that in 
terms of his retirement income plays a heavy role. 177 If individuals lack attachment to the system 
 
and lack income to contribute to it, suggestively, the system will continue to have problems and 
the government will have to continue to fund it. 
 
Even the most vocal critics of the current system such as Silvia Borzutzky admit that the 
public funded government system was inefficient. 178 Clearly, a dictatorship and the rise of 
neoliberals under Pinochet successfully implemented a market oriented Social Security program. 
While it was intended to minimize government spending, history has shown that it has not 
achieved its objective. Nevertheless, governments after the Pinochet dictatorship have continued 
to support the system, because they realize that returning to a fully public system would alienate 
the AFP industry. Thus Chilean governments are forced to decide between the economy or social 
conditions. Based on previous presidential administrations it seems unlikely that Chile will 
return to a fully funded public system. However, reforms under governments such as Michelet 
Bachelet in 2008 indicate that the system can be modified allowing the government to take a 
larger role in social security. Arguably, at this current point in time this appears to be the case as 
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a government has gradually taken on increased responsibility to ensure that a majority of the 
population receives Social Security benefits. Chile may be seen as a country that is in a transition 
phase, as the government increasingly takes a more active role in Social Security. Nevertheless, 
its involvement indicates that the overall model for Social Security provided by corporations has 
not been efficient as its advocates once claimed and thus the Chilean government once again 
finds itself funding the system in order to ensure that all individuals have access to Social 
Security benefits. 
 
Theoretically a Social Security system that requires minimal government expenditure has 
the ability to allow government to focus its attention on other important aspects in society. 
Theoretically, companies would compete with each other in order to gain the most customers and 
such competition would increase overall benefits individuals received in the state. Realistically, 
competition has not resulted in increased benefits for individuals who use the service, and more 
importantly the state continues to use its resources in order to help individuals who are unable to 
receive benefits from the current privatized Social Security system. Therefore, Chile can be seen 
as a country that shows the inherent flaws in a fully privatized Social Security system. 
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Appendix I Interview Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
12) 6Tienes un Ahorro de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? Cuál es el nombre de la empresa de 
su AFP? Do you  have an Ahorro de Fondos Previsional  (AFP)? what company do you 
use? 
13) 6 Aproximamiento cuanto ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ano? [approximately how 
 
much does your job pay you each month? Year? 
 
14) 6Que porcentaje de su sueldo pones en tu AFP? What percentage of your salary do you 
put into your AFP? 
15) 6Guardas, mucho de tu dinero en su AFP? Do you save a lot of your salary and put  it 
 
into your AFP? 
 
16) 6Cuales son los incentivos para ti para poner tu dinero en una AFP?  What are the 
 
incentives for putting your salary into an AFP 
 
17) 6Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en una AFP? Puedes explicar si 
o no? What are the reasons that you would prefer to put less of your salary into an 
AFP? Could you please explain your reasons? 
18) 6Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en tu fondo previsional? Has puesto más dinero en 
tu AFP antes o después de las tenias 30 anos Porque hay una diferencia en la cuenta? 
How many months have you  contributed to your AFP?  did you put  more money in your 
AFP  before or after you  turned 30. 
19) Antes de las AFP's, usaste el sistema publica para obtener beneficios y jubilar? Qué 
prefieres mas el sistema de antes de 1980 o los AFP's? Porque? (Depende en la edad de 
la trabajador) Before the implementation of AFPs did you use the old provisional 
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system (PAYGO)? do you prefer the AFP system over the old system? [note this is age 
dependent and also dependent on when the individual started working] 
20) (,Puedes explicar el tipo de AFP tienes. Por ejemplo hay muchos riesgos con su AFP, 
por ejemplo muchas inversiones que podrían darte beneficios o también problemas? 0 
prefieres los AFP que no tienen muchas inversiones, pero también producen menos 
riesgos y beneficios? Porque escogiste tu tipo de AFP? Could you please explain the 
type of AFP you have? For example are you required to take a lot of risks with your 
AFP in order to receive a lot of benefits?Or do you have a more moderate AFP 
system, which allows you to take fewer risks but also allows you to receive fewer 
benefits? 
 
 
 
21) (,Has perdido un trabajo? Durante el tiempo que no tenía trabajo ponías dinero en tu 
fondo previsional? Usaste dinero en su fondo previsional durante el tiempo que no 
tenía trabajo? Have you  lost a job?   During this time did you put  money into your 
retirement fund?  Did you  use any money in your  retirement fund  to help you when you 
did not have a job? 
22) (,Que información tiene sobre su AFP? 
 
 
what do you know about the AFP plan you have? 
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The following five respondents were selected because they currently use the AFP system.  The 
interviews attempted to learn their perceptions about the current system, and gain information 
about each individual's overall comprehension of the current system.  While the first three 
individuals tend to favor the system because it helps them retire, the last two, are more skeptical 
of the system, and have found other ways to increase their pension savings. 
 
 
 
 
Respondent 1) 
 
a) Female 20 years old 
 
b) College Student 
 
c) Single Mother 
 
d) Living with Family 
 
 
 
 
l)Tienes un Ahorros de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? Cuál es el nombre de la empresa de su 
AFP 
Hábitat. Lo escogí porque es muy barato y lo use para mi primer trabajo. Lo escogí porque 
una persona me había dicho que la empresa era buena. 
 
2) Aproximamiento como ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ano? 
 
 
Nose. 
 
 
3) Qué porcentaje de su sueldo pones en su AFP? 
 
 
Pongo 10 porciento de mi sueldo en la AFP. Si recibo más dinero yo pondría más dinero 
en mi AFP. Cuando tengo trabajo, pongo mi sueldo en la AFP, cuando no tengo trabajo no 
recibo ayuda del gobierno, y no puedo poner dinero en mi AFP . 
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4)Guard as, mucho de su dinero en su AFP? 
 
 
5) Como son los incentivos para ti para poner dinero en un AFP? 
 
 
La {mica raz6n es para jubilar. 
 
 
6) Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en un AFP? Puedes explicar si o no? 
 
 
No tengo desincentivos para usar el sistema . Pero también, me gustaría poder usar mi sueldo 
para otras casas por ejemplo para comprar cosas que me gusta. 
 
7)En su opinion, no tienes problemas que la cantidad que tiene que pagar su AFP para 
guardar su dinero? 
 
Podría ser que la inversión es alta. 
 
 
8) Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en su fondo previsionales? Has puesto mas dinero en su 
AFP 
 
antes o después 30. Porque hay una diferencia en la cuenta? 
 
 
9) Antes de AFP's, usaste al sistema publica para obtener beneficios y jubilar? Qué prefieres 
mas al sistema antes de 1980 o los AFP's? Porque? (Depende en la edad de la 
trabajador)[Did not 
ask, respondent entered work force after 1980} 
 
 
10) Has perdido un trabajo? Durante el tiempo que no tenía trabajo ponías dinero en su fondo 
previsional? Usaste dinero en su fondo previsional durante el tiempo que no tenía trabajo? 
 
Si, pero cuando no tengo trabajo mis padres me ayudan. Ponen dinero en mi AFP . 
 
 
Respondent 2) Male, 25, Lives with family, student 
 
 
1) Tienes  Abonos de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? 
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Si tengo JNG Capital 
 
2) (,Cuanto ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ru1o? 
 
En mi último ano ganaba mensual$ 205.512 restándole a esto los descuentos legales, 
no puedo !weber estimaci6n anual  que no he trabajado en un año completo. 
 
3)(.Que porcentaje de su sueldo pone en su AFP? Guardas, más que el 10 porcentaje en su 
AFP? 
 
EL 10 % va a mi AFP . 
 
4)(. Cuáles son los incentivos para ti para poner dinero en un AFP? 
 
 
 
El tener una jubilación.. 
 
5)Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en un AFP (,Puedes explicar si o 
no? 
 
Tener más dinero en el presente. pero claramente seria irrsesponsable de mi parte para 
mifutura vejez. 
 
6) (,Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en su fondo previsional? Si has puesto mas 
dinero en su AFP puedes explicar las razones que decidiste a poner mas dinero en su 
AFP 
 
Nose cuantos meses he puesto dinero en mi modo provisional.  he tenido trabajos 
e. portadiscos,  que d i f í c i l  a calcular. . Nunca  has puesto  mas dinero [mas que 10%.} 
Nunca  he puesto  más dinero en mi AFP,  quizás en el futuro con un mejor sueldo . 
 
7) Puedes explicar el tipo de AFP tienes. Por ejemplo hay muchos riesgos con su AFP, por 
ejemplo muchas inversiones que podrían dar beneficios o también problemas? 
0 prefieres los AFP que no tienen muchas inversiones, pero también producen menos 
riesgos y 
beneficios? Porque escogiste su tipo de AFP? 
 
-El que escogió mi AFP. Fue el contador de la empresa donde yo comencé a 
trabajar. [No tengo información sobre] los riesgos y beneficios de cotizar en mi AFP 
 
8).  Usas el sistema voluntario para guardar para jubilar? (Usas una APV) 
 
No ocupo este sistema de Ahorro Previsional Voluntario. 
 
9) Hay  varias opciones para escoger su AFP? Si puedes explicar porque escogiste este 
tipo. Si no leíste sobre su AFP antes pusiste dinero en la AFP? Si no leíste puedes 
explicar porque no leíste sobre la AFP 
 
No leí  sobre el AFP El contador de mi primer empleo determino cual sería mi AFP, fue 
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10) El gobierno te dio ayuda con financiar tu AFP mientras no tenias trabajo? Par 
ejemplo el gobierno puso dinero en su cuenta para suplementar su dinero necesario 
para jubilar? Si n, Crees que esta sistema es justa? El gobierno debe hacer que para 
ayudarte cuando no tienes trabajo para incrementar su Dinero? 
 
-No el gobierno no me ayudo cuando no tenía trabajo. El gobierno debe ayudar a 
las personas sin trabajo pagando. 
 
 
 
 
11) Si podrías cambiar cosas en el sistema que cambiarias? En tu opinion porque es 
necesario para cambiar el sistema? 
 
Cada AFP debe entregar mayor información a los personas para que tomen una 
buena decisión a la hora de afiliarse a una AFP y no pase como a mí que otro tomo la 
decisión por mí. 
 
 
 
 
Respondent 3) Male, 50, Independent worker  
 
 
 
 
1)  En que ano empezaste a trabajar? 
 
1987. 
 
2) Tienes un Ahorros de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? Cuál es el nombre de la empresa 
de su AFP? 
 
Si tengo una AFP, mi primera AFP fue Santa Maria, pero ahorra uso CUPRUM 
 
 
3) Aproximamiento como ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ano? 
 
[Did not ask respondent] 
 
4) Qué porcentaje de su sueldo pones en su AFP? Aproximamiento como cantidad de 
su sueldo pones en su AFP? 
10%. Ahora  estoy poniendo  la mínima  en mi AFP . No estoy como un empleado. 
 
Ahorra, estoy como un trabajador independiente. [Note independent workers do 
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not have to put money into AFPs} Es muy difícil para mí a poner mas que 10% 
de mi sueldo en un AFP porque mi sueldo es fijo. Pongo la mínima porque 
tengo que usar la otro parte de mi sueldo en otras casas. 
5) Guardas, mucho de su dinero en su AFP? 
 
[this question was unnecessary since respondent answered it in 
previous question) 
6) Cuáles son los incentivos para ti para poner dinero en un AFP? 
 
Para jubilar. 
 
7) Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en un AFP? Puedes explicar 
si o no? 
Si prefiero poder usar mas para otras casas, pero en realidad tengo que poner 
la mínima cuando soy un empleado. 
8) Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en su fondo previsionales? Has puesto más dinero en 
su AFP antes o después 30. Porque hay una diferencia en la cuenta? 
No he tenido trabajo, con un contrato, entonces no he tenido la oportunidad 
para poner más en mi AFP. 
9) Antes de AFP's, usaste al sistema publica para obtener beneficios y jubilar? Qué 
prefieres mas el sistema antes de 1980 o los AFP's? Porque? (Depende en la edad de la 
trabajador) 
Mira, tenía que poner mi sueldo en una  AFP. Me gustan las AFPs ... Cuando 
comenzaron las AFP fueron  reguladas. El control es buena para las AFP 's, no 
sé como de otra forma funcionaria.  Mi papa me dijo que el recibi6 mas 
beneficios desde el sistema antiguo que los trabajadores reciben de los  
trabajadores hoy. 
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10)Puedes explicar el tipo de AFP tienes. Por ejemplo hay muchos riesgos con su AFP, 
por ejemplo muchas inversiones que podrían darte beneficios o también problemas? 
0 prefieres los AFP que no tienen muchas inversiones, pero también producen 
menos riesgos y beneficios? Porque escogiste su tipo de AFP? 
Riesgos no son grandes. CUPRUM ha hecho buenos casas en contabilidad. 
 
11) Has perdido un trabajo? Durante el tiempo que no tenía trabajo ponías dinero en su 
fondo previsional? Usaste dinero en su fondo previsional durante el tiempo que no 
tenía  trabajo? 
Cuando no tenía trabajo, el gobierno no puso dinero en mi AFP. Solamente 
cuando tengo trabajo puedo poner dinero en mi AFP . 
12) Que información sobre su AFP? 
 
Veo mis resultos cada dos o tres meses. 
 
 
Respondent 4) Retired, Male, 55, Single 
 
This interview differs from the ones above because it was conducted informally.  In 
this sense, the interview occurred over a meal , and I felt that it was better for me to 
listen rather than attempt to take notes.  Even though the questions are limited, the 
respondent's perceptions in regards to the AFP system should not be devalued. 
 
 
 
 
1) Tienes un AFP 
 
 
Tuve BBUVA Provida 
2) Cuáles son sus opiniones sobre las AFPs 
 
 
 
Mira no creo en las AFPs, y porque, porque es imposible juntar suficiente 
dinero para jubilar.  Par ejemplo sabes que básicamente, para jubilar y vivir 
necesitas como 72 millones [72, 000,000 pesos is approximately 
$144,OOO]para jubilar, yes 
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imposible, para obtener. Es imposible obtener la cantidad porque tienes que 
ser un profesional.  Tienes que ser, un doctor, abogado etc. Y también no me 
gusta el sistema porque tengo que pagar una administrador guardar mi 
dinero. No es Justo, y también, si hay una crisis como la que ocurri6 en 2008, 
muchas persona s perdieron su dinero para Jubilar , pero las AFPs no dieron 
dinero. En mi opinion hay demasiados riesgos. No, no me gusta el sistema. 
 
2) Pero sabes que hay un sistema que se llama PASIS y también da ayuda al público? 
 
 
 
 
 
Si, pero también recuerda que, muchas personas tienen que trabajar, para jubilar . Y 
con ayuda del gobierno muchas personas van a recibir beneficios pero también muchas 
personas no van a recibirlos. Vivo con unos egipcios, y nunca han recibido ayuda del 
gobierno, y sabes porque, porque, estando colectando suficiente dinero, y el gobierno ha 
decidido, no es necesario para ayudarlos. Entonces, no han recibido ayuda. 
 
3) Si puedes cambiar el sistema como cambiarias 
 
 
-Mira, me gusta la idea que personas ahorren su dinero, pero ahora no es justo 
porque muchas personas quienes estan trabajando, estan recibiendo el sueldo mínima . 
Entonces, es muy difícil para Jubilar. Ahora aquí el sueldo mínima es de dos mil y quinientos 
pesos al día. No es suficiente para guardar en los AFPs y también usar dinero pero otras 
casas. Si los trabajadores reciban mas sueldo sería diferente porque tendrían más 
oportunidades para poner sus sueldos en AFPs. 
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Respondent 5) Female, Single, Teacher 
 
 
1) Tienes un Ahorros de Fondos Previsionales (AFP)? Cuál es el nombre de la 
empresa de su AFP 
BBVA Pr6vida. He usado BBVA par siete anos. Pero lo cuesta mucho para 
mantener, y también, hubo los beneficios no son suficiente. Ahora, tengo 
ambos un AFP , también A VP. Tengo ambos para aumentar mi sueldo. 
2) Aproximamiento como ganas en tu trabajo, cada mes, y ano? 
 
Un millon [pesos} 
 
3) Qué porcentaje de su sueldo pones en su AFP? Aproximamiento como cantidad 
de su sueldo pones en su AFP? 
 
Pongo I 0% de mi sue/to. 
 
 
4) Cuáles son los incentivos para ti para poner dinero en un AFP? 
 
Los incentivos son !a de unidad para jubilar 
 
5) Hay razones que preferirías poner menos de su sueldo en un AFP? Puedes explicar 
si o no? 
No me gusta el sistema porque tengo que tomar más riesgos para recibir 
más beneficios. No puedo bajar mis riesgos porque el sistema quiere que 
los trabajadores accedan más riesgos para obtener más beneficios. 
6) Cuantos meses has puesto dinero en su fonda previsionales? Has puesto mi dinero en 
su AFP antes o después 30. Porque hay una diferencia en la cuenta? 
Did not ask age 
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7) Puedes explicar el tipo de AFP tienes. Por ejemplo hay muchos riesgos con su AFP, 
por ejemplo muchas inversiones que podrían darte beneficios o también problemas? 
0 prefieres los AFP que no tienen muchas inversiones, pero también producen 
menos riesgos y beneficios? Porque escogiste su tipo de AFP? 
Es como te dijo, tengo que aceptar riesgos, los trabajadores D6venes} tienen que 
aceptar mas riesgos, que las personas que han trabajado par mucho tiempo. 
8) l Tienes un APV? 
 
a. Si tengo un APV. Usa para aumentar mi AFP. Pero no uso mi dinero en mi 
APV para casas como enfermedades. Me gusta este sistema más porque es 
más fácil, y también tiene menos riesgos en este sistema en relaci6n al sistema 
de AFPs. 
 
 
 
 
Independent Workers. The following  two respondents were selected because they did not 
have AFPs. Both, earns low amounts of income, but the difference between the two was that 
the car washer, did not have to enter into the AFP system because he was already in the old 
social security system. Conversely, the second respondent knew that she had to enter into the 
AFP system, but knew little about the system. Based on the second individual's responses, she 
has a high probability of simply selecting an AFP, without much knowledge about it. Thus, 
this respondent is unlikely to understand the benefits and drawbacks associated with AFPs. 
 
Respondent 6: Male, 57, Car Washer 
 
 
 
 
1) Eres un trabajador independiente? 
 
 
Si. 
 
2) Tienes una AFP 
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No, no tengo una AFP. Tengo seguro social, el sistema antiguo que era 
antes de las AFPs. 
 
 
 
3) Cuanto ganas por dia? 
 
 
 
Recibo 7 o 8 mil cada dia. [7 or 8000 each day. This is 
equivalent to approximately 16 dollars per day] 
 
 
 
4) Puedes decirme cuanto usa de su sueldo por sus cosas? Por ejemplo 
cuantas pagas para comprar  comida? Electricidad Otras cosas? 
 
Pago 1 mil para mi piso. Pago aproximo 1500 pesos por 
almuerzo, y 1500 pesos para cigarros y bebida. 
 
 
 
5) Sabes que todas las personas tendran que tener una AFP para el 2015 
 
[Note worker in old system doesn't have to change to privatized one] 
6) Tienes que poner 10% de su sueldo en una AFP. Crees que tendrás, el 
sueldo suficiente para hacerlo? 
 
question not applicable 
 
 
 
 
7) ;_, Cual es su opinion, quieres tener un AFP? 
 
Trabaje antes del sistema ahora. Cuando Pinochet [implemento] el 
 
nueva  sistema, mi papa me dijo que me quedara en el sistema social seguro. 
Me dijo que el nuevo sistema no era buena, y si ponga dinero en el honor de 
sistema, lo perdería . 
 
 
 
 
9) Recibes ayuda del gobierno 
 
a. Tengo 14 millones de pesos en seguridad social. El gobierno aumento mi 
sueldo, recibo un 2% de mi sueldo en seguridad social, del gobierno. 
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Respondent 7) 
 
1) Eres un trabajador independiente? 
Si. 
 
 
2) Tienes una AFP? 
 
 
No. 
 
 
 
3) Sabes que tienes que usarlo por 20 15? 
Si. 
 
 
 
4) Quieres usar el sistema de las AFPs? 
 
 
 
Si quiero usarlo. Si tengo una AFP no tendría que preocuparme sobre la jubilaci6n. 
 
 
 
5) Tienes que poner 10% de su sueldo en una AFP. Crees que tendrás, un sueldo 
suficiente para hacerlo? Hay programas que ayudan personas que no tienen suficiente sueldo 
para poner en una AFP. Piensas que va a usar esta parte del sistema? 
 
 
 
Si. Si. [Response to 2nd question] 
 
 
 
6) Sabes mucho sobre las AFPs? Como recibes información sobre los AFPs (Lees o ves 
la televisión para obtener información? 
 
 
 
no.  no veo mucho tele. No estoy muy informado sobre el nuevo sistema. 
 
 
 
7) Como te vas a informar sobre el sistema? Tienes mucho tiempo para ser informado si 
lo haces? 
 
 
 
Puedo ir a cada AFP para [obtener] información.  No tengo mucho tiempo para los 
verlos. 
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8) Si tuvieras mas dinero guardarias mas? 
 
 
 
Si. 
9) Porque no has puesto dinero en AFP 
 
 
 
No he tenido mucho tiempo para hacerlo. 
 
 
 
10) Cuanto ganas cada mes? 
 
 
 
$180.000 
 
 
 
11) Puedes decirme cuanto usas de tu sueldo para tus cosas? Por ejemplo cuantas pagas 
para comprar comida? Electricidad? Comida? Otras cosas? 
 
 
 
[Respondent could only give estimate about electricity} mas o menos 12 mil cada mes. 
 
 
 
13)   Hay alguna raz6n por la que no quieres una AFP? 
No. 
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Raul Madrid, author of ideas, economic pressures, and pension privatization argues that 
the implementation of the privatized system in Chile has been counterproductive because 
economic growth is not occurring at the privatization of pensions.  While politicians have argued 
that privatization of pensions has the ability to reduce the amount of government spending for 
Social Security, such claims are misrepresented.  Madrid notes, "economic crisis has undermined 
support for the existing state led development models in many countries, which paved the way 
for market oriented reforms such as pension privatization." 179 Economic crises allowed 
 
politicians to claim that inefficiencies in government have hindered social living conditions for 
Chileans and claimed that a privatized pension is necessary because individual funds will not be 
mismanaged and the overall standard of living will increase.  However, strong evidence suggests 
that the implementation of privatization of pension funds will not increase overall economic 
growth or standards of living in Chile.  Madrid notes, "pension privatization schemes are costly 
in the medium term because they allow (or oblige) members of the Social Security system to 
transfer some portion of their Social Security conjugations to private pension fund."  The switch 
to a privatized system has forced the state to continue to pay for Social Security benefits for the 
 
 
 
 
179 Madrid 24. 
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older population as it attempts to transition to the privatized system. 180 Arguably, the high 
amount of transfer rates combined with the state's need to pay pension funds indicates there are 
fewer government resources because the state continues to pay for retirees pensions as well as 
the transition to a fully privatized pension system.  Contrary to politicians, evidence shows that 
the state has become less discretionary in terms of spending. 
 
 
Furthermore, Madrid challenges critics who argue that the implementation of private 
pension funds encourage individuals save more money thereby reducing reliance on government 
aid. While Madrid notes that "between 1982 and 2000, the pension funds generated returns 
averaging 10.9% annually above inflation.  As a result of the strong returns, pensions have so far 
been substantially higher in the Chilean private system than in the public's system in spite of the 
lower level of contributions and the relatively high administrative costs in the private system. "181 
 
While the pension system can be seen as a success in states such as Chile, arguably, the high 
levels of administrative costs as well as the low levels of individual investment indicate that 
people are generally hesitant to put money into the pension system even though there are high 
levels of returns.  Furthermore, the high costs that administrative burdens require show the 
private pension system is not perfect; overall costs remain high proving that attempts to reduce 
inefficient spending remain unsuccessful.  As Madrid concludes, "any countries have opted to 
privatize their pension systems in the belief that such measures would boost their sagging 
domestic savings rates and solve long-term financial problems of their public pension systems . 
There is no clear-cut evidence, however the pension privatization will resolve either of these 
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181 Madrid 31. 
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economic problems." 182 clearly, this article highlights the problems associated with the private 
pension plan . 
 
This article is helpful in several aspects first; it challenges the assumption that privatized 
pensions have the ability to help states become financially solvent.  As debate emerges over the 
implementation of pensions, Madrid shows that the overall cost of the implementation of the new 
system are equally costly to older public pension systems, and do not lead to higher savings rates 
within Chile. Evidence would suggest that the overall growth of pension rates might be 
temporary; however, the lack of overall investment indicates that many Chileans are hesitant to 
invest in a fully privatized system that explains the overall low savings rates in such systems. 
Arguably, this poses a problem that will face the Chilean government in the long run; if 
individuals are generally unwilling to invest large amounts of money in private pensions, there is 
a heavier risk that an economic crisis will cause them to become more reliant on the government 
for work financial aid.  Arguably, the pension system was supposed to reduce reliance on 
government spending, but in reality government spending continued because of high costs of the 
new system as well as poor saving rates by Chileans. 
 
 
 
 
 
Alberto Arenas de Mesa, Bravo David; Jere Behrman; Olivia Mitchell; and Petra Todd. The 
Chilean pension reform turns 25: lessons from the social protection survey. July 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors of this article give a brief history of the previous pension systems, known as 
provisional systems, which were implemented in Chile. After being replaced by, Administradora 
 
182 Madrid 44. 
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de Fondos de Pensiones-Provida (AFP's) systems in the 1980s, individuals have been more 
likely to put money into their savings accounts in order to save for retirement. Nevertheless, the 
development of private pension systems is also important in part because they contribute to 
economic growth in Chile. The authors note that the private pension funds have played an 
increasingly growing role in the Chilean economy since 1980 and have increased their total 
market share of gross medic product to approximately 60% of the GDP in Chile's economy. 183 
Viewed from this perspective, the government has an increased incentive to continue the (AFP's) 
 
because they are necessary for the continuous economic growth within the state. As the authors 
note, "initially all AFP monies were invested in government bonds, more recently pension fund 
managers have been permitted to offer a broader so regulated array of investment choices." 184 
This article is important because it shows that the AFP's play significant role in overall 
economic growth in Chile, while also intriguing to retirement funds for pension holders. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on AFP's shows that privatized pension system is incredibly 
important for the continuous economic growth in Chile. 
 
The authors of this article study the overall demographic trends of Chileans and their use 
of pension plans. According to the authors, the new pension plan in Chile was implemented 
because many Chileans did not invest in the public pension system run by the government. 
Nevertheless, the study finds that overall growth in the Chilean pension system remains minimal 
and challenges prior assumptions that suggested Chileans would be more satisfied with private 
pension funds. Furthermore, the study finds that most Chileans are uninformed about their 
pension plans. According to the authors, "only half of one percent of all respondents claims to 
know both the fixed and variable commissions. The fact that workers and savers know virtually 
 183 Alberto Arenas de Mesa, David Bravo, Jere Bherman, Olivia Mitchell, Petra Todd, 9 
184 Ibid., 8. 
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nothing about the costs of investing their funds suggests that there is much work to be done to 
educate Chileans about this key aspect of their retirement system."185 Clearly, the lack of 
education that Chileans know about the pension problems is problematic there are three different 
types of pension systems which vary from conservative investment practices to very risky 
investment practices. If Chileans are uninformed about their overall investments, this suggests 
that they may be heavily reliant on a system which is supposed to provide them with financial 
returns, but in the long run may not do so in part because of their lack of knowledge about the 
financial incentives that they receive from their pension plans. As a result, when retirement 
becomes evident, many Chileans may not have enough money in their pension plans to retire,  
and thus may be forced to work more years. 
 
This article is important because it provides historical analysis about the previous pension 
systems implemented in Chile prior to 1980 as well as the current private pension systems. 
Arguably, this article's importance can be found in its samples of the Chilean population and its 
discoveries about Chileans perspectives on their own pension fund. This article has been useful 
in helping me develop questions I will ask Chileans. This article also provides helpful statistical 
tables measuring overall perceptions of the private pension fund in Chile examining 
demographic and social views towards the overall pension fund. I can use the tables in this 
article to compare my own results, which will allow me to highlight the similarities and 
differences between my own findings and those found in the statistical tables. I believe that this 
will allow me to find contrasting opinions about the overall pension funds.  I believe the surveys 
and education about the pension funds in Chile conducted through my own questions will allow 
 
 
 
 
185 Alberto Arenas de Mesa, David Bravo, Jere Bherman, Olivia Mitchell, Petra Todd, 18. 
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me to use more acute the statistical evidence found in this article, which will allow me to 
emphasize the overall knowledge, Chileans have about their pension system. 
 
Arturo Conde Marcus Porter. Harvard business school: AFP Provida 
 
 
This article focuses on the positive aspects that have occurred with the implementation of 
the private pension system in Chile. As the authors note, Chile was one of the earliest Latin 
American countries to implement a private pension system that encouraged competition amongst 
various fim1s in order to encourage Chileans to invest in pension funds. Although the authors  
note that, the private pension system was implemented under an authoritarian regime they note, 
"Since the transition to democratic governments, privatization and deregulation efforts have 
deepened. Real gross domestic product (GDP) has averaged 7.3% between 1990 and 1998. After 
a sharp recession in 1999, the economy was growing again, albeit with a much higher 
unemployment rate." 186 While the authors like to show that private pension systems have 
 
contributed to strong economic growth, their support for private pension funds is an effective 
counter example to the flaws found in private pensions. While authors argue that private pension 
system hurt Chileans, the authors note "... During the first eight years that private pensions were 
implemented, pensioner's profitability was significantly higher because of strong AFP 
competition in Chile. Nevertheless, the authors note, "... After a consolidation period 
characterized by mergers, disillusioned, and bankruptcies, the number of AFP's stood at 
eight." 187 Arguably, with reduced competition between AFP firms in Chile, as the industry in 
 
Chile has become more concentrated and less competition has emerged , consequently Chileans 
are receiving fewer benefits from the system because companies offer similar services to all 
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individuals without having to worry about overall share of market competition. In this sense, the 
overall benefits that individuals receive from the private pension system need to be questioned. 
 
While the authors argue that, the implementation of the private pension system has 
reduced reliance on government ample evidence challenges their claims. Arguably, while they 
support private pensions, their own statistics contradict their support for the system in Chile. One 
of the issues that the authors fail to address is the disparity of income levels found in Chile. 
"Large pension firms such as AFP habitat attempt to attract individuals whose pensions are in the 
high to upper middle classes ...AFP habitat focused on the middle to high income segment of the 
Chilean workforce, with the most appealing commission structure for this segment, a high fixed 
commission combined with the second lowest variable fee." 188 Clearly, the current pension 
 
system is beneficial for high middle classes families and excludes lower classes in part because 
of the high pension fees individuals must pay. Supporting this argument, the authors note that 
AFP Santa Maria "target low to middle-income individuals and charge the highest fixed fee in 
the market. '' 189 The high fixed rate costs compared to a much more upscale pension private firm 
 
targeted at middle to high middle income Chileans indicates that even pension funds designed to 
attract the lower income Chileans family's shows that Chileans who lack high monetary 
resources pay the same amount of money as upper-class families in the private pension system. 
In this sense, arguably, middle and lower class Chileans are paying much more of their overall 
salary in order to receive similar benefits that are found in upper middle to high-class pension 
families in Chile. 
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Altman 79  
 
 
This article is important because it provides a counter representation to the dominant 
theory that pension privatization in Chile has not benefited the population. While it provides 
statistics showing overall economic growth and overall benefits that individuals have gained  
from the implementation of privatized pension system it fails to address the economic disparities 
between wealthy and lower class individuals who are forced to use the private pension system . 
While the private pension system encourages individuals to save more money in order to retire, 
the high pension service costs and programs that are targeted towards middle and lower classes 
indicate that many families are paying large amounts of their overall salary in order to receive 
benefits the same benefits that upper middle class and high income Chileans receive.  Arguably, 
pension plans should be geared towards the individual and the fact that pension plans are unable 
to deliver similar benefits to all Chileans indicates that the beneficiaries from the privatized 
pension plan remain high middle class Chileans. I will use this article to refute a growing 
perception that privatized pension plans are beneficial to Chileans as well as other people in the 
world. Furthermore, this article will be used to show the benefits of pension plans which were  
not addressed in other articles. 
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